The 2 x 2 x 2 case in causality, of an effect, a cause and a confounder. A cross-over’s guide to the 2 x 2 x 2 contingency table by Colignatus, Thomas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The 2 x 2 x 2 case in causality, of an
effect, a cause and a confounder. A
cross-over’s guide to the 2 x 2 x 2
contingency table
Thomas Colignatus
Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics
30. May 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3351/
MPRA Paper No. 3351, posted 29. May 2007
The 2 × 2 × 2 case in 
causality, of an effect, a 
cause and a confounder
A cross-over’s guide to the 2 × 2 × 
2 contingency table
Thomas Colignatus, May 29 2007
http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool
(c) Thomas Cool
Summary
Basic  causality  is  that  a  cause  is  present  or  absent  and  that  the  effect  follows  with  a
success or not. This happy state of affairs becomes opaque when there is a third variable
that  can  be present  or  absent  and  that  might be a  seeming cause.  The  2 × 2 × 2 layout
deserves  the  standard  name of  the  ETC contingency table,  with  variables  Effect,  Truth
and Confounding and values {S, -S}, {C, -C}, {F, -F}. Assuming the truth  we can find
the impact of the cause from when the confounder is absent. The 8 cells in the crosstable
can be fully parameterized and the conditions for a proper cause can be formulated, with
the  parameters  interpretable  as  regression  coefficients.  Requiring  conditional
independence would be too strong since it neglects some causal processes. The Simpson
paradox  will  not  occur  if  logical  consistency  is  required  rather  than  conditional
independence. The paper gives a taxonomy of issues of confounding, a parameterization
by  risk  or  safety,  and  develops  the  various  cases  of  dependence  and  (conditional)
independence.  The paper is supported by software that allows variations.  The paper has
been  written  by  an  econometrician  used  to  structural  equations  models  but  visiting
epidemiology hoping to use those techniques in experimental economics.
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Introduction
Experimental  economics  may sometimes borrow techniques  from epidemiology but  the
different  fields  may  use  different  terminologies  so  that  the  translation  may  not  be  too
easy. There may also be hidden assumptions that make sense in one field but no sense in
the  other  one.  The  following  is  a  case  in  point.  Schield  (1999,  2003),  “Simpson’s
paradox  and  Cornfield’s  conditions”,  gives an  interesting  if  not  illuminating  discussion
on causality versus confounding that would be of general interest  to economics as well.
However,  after  closer  investigation  there  appear  to  be  some assumptions  that  probably
were all too obvious for the epidemiologists but that at first escaped the attention of this
author  who  is  a  mere  econometrician  trained  in  “structural  equations  modelling”.  The
general  setting  is  interesting  in  itself.  Pearl  (2000)  explains  that  economics  has  a  long
tradition of handling causality and indeed using those structural  equations models. Thus
both fields of study handle causality, as all scientists must. Yet, the different conventions
and  uses  of  language  can  still  cause  problems  of  translation.  The  following  tries  to
bridge the communication gap. The following discussion thus is only for scientists  who
cross over. Scientists working in only their own field of study and not the other may not
be  particularly  enticed  by  this  effort  at  translation  since  they  will  not  experience  any
problems in communication. Also, this article has been written by an economist and the
examples will be from epidemiology. The discussion is directed at the fellow cross-overs
or  the  high-potentials  for  doing  so.  Economists  who  have  never  seen  the  terminology
before may need to exercise some patience. And epidemiologists crossing over might be
abhorred by this economic look at their subject.
The simplest case in causality and confounding is when the variables for effect, causality
and confounding have only 2 values each, i.e. “present” versus “absent”, which gives a 2
×  2  ×  2  contingency  table.  The  data  are  mere  counts.  Thus  we  have  nominal  data
collected  in  a  contingency  table.  Since  it  is  useful  to  have  easy  mnenomics  and  since
“causality” and “confounding” both start with a “c”, the causality variable will be called
“truth”.  Hence  the  standard  layout  is  the  ETC  crosstable  with  Effect,  Truth  and
Confounding  as  the  variables,  and  with  entries  {Success,  ¬Success},  {Cause,  ¬Cause}
and {Confounder, ¬Confounder} as the values that the variables can take.
For  clarity  and  completeness  it  must  be  emphasized  that  this  discussion  thus  excludes
the  2  ×  2  ×  2  contingency  table  where  there  would  be  one  cause  and  two  common
effects,  or  one  effect  and  two  confounders,  or  two  effects  and  one  confounder,  or  just
three variables whatsoever where the researcher is merely interested in some association.
Also excluded is the 2 × 2 × 2 contingency table where the effect  is an incidence count
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and  another  dimension  contains  person-years  so  that  those  two  dimensions  are  merely
used  to  calculate  the  proper  effect  variable  of  incidence  rates:  since  that  table  comes
down to the 2 × 2 case.
It  is  also  assumed that  the  causal  relations  are  rather  simple.  The  question  on the  table
(in  a  double  sense)  is  just  the  direct  line  from the  other  two variables  to  the  effect,  all
other possibilities excluded. Normally the researcher has a theory of the problem at hand
and this should help the researcher to determine the direction of causation. For example,
when the Central Bank raises the rate of interest then the mortgage rate will usually rise
as well but it is less likely that when you personally switch to another mortgager with a
lower  rate  that  the  Central  Bank  will  follow  too.  In  the  relation  between  smoking and
lung  cancer,  it  may  be  that  the  effect  (lung  cancer)  may  cause  people  to  smoke,  but
theory will suggest that this is not the most likely order of events except for a few cases
where  it  indeed might happen in that  way. It may also be that all  three variables derive
from a joint common cause. But that would introduce a fourth variable and that is not the
current problem.
The  problem  setting  is  that  the  researcher  has  no  easy  way  to  determine  the  time
sequence  of  events.  The  data  may be  aggregated  over  time  so  that  all  sequential  detail
might be lost. The effect is unquestionable but there would be doubt about the cause. We
may  apply  the  table  to  a  randomized  controlled  trial  but  we  might  also  apply  it  to  an
observational study. The limitations to intervention can be practical or moral, in that you
would not willingly subject an economy to huge inflation or unemployment, or subject a
person  to  some disease.  Hence  cause  and  confounder  are  observed  simultaneously  and
the key question is whether the statistical proportions allow us to determine which of the
two  is  the  true  cause.  With  Y  =  E  as  the  variable  that  must  be  explained  and  the
explanatory variables X and Z, then one tries both ETC = EXZ and ETC = EZX, and sees
whether the statistical proportions give the confounder away. In this paper we tackle this
problem by assuming that we know the true cause and then see whether it indeed can be
detected.  Our  approach  is  logical,  in  that  we  analyze  the  data  as  they  are,  in  terms  of
categories  and  properties,  and  we  don’t  consider  the  question  that  the  quantities  or
properties are so close together that we would need assumptions on theoretical statistical
distributions.  We  call  the  confounder  the  “confounder”  since  we  have  to  look  to  the
situation where it is absent to find the true impact of the cause.
We will take the position of a student who is used to the 2 × 2 table and who is suddenly
exposed  to  the  shock  of  a  third  variable.  Our  position  is  a  bit  like  the  reader  of
Kleinbaum et al. (2003), “ActivEpi”. Studying this book, the student has been using 2 ×
2 tables for 9 chapters and then in chapter 10 suddenly meets a third variable. The shock
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might cause that the student doesn’t understand anything anymore. The student has been
creating explanations and assumptions of himself or herself for 9 chapters to make sense
of the analyses but suddenly is confronted  with confounding, which is not only the title
of  chapter  10  but  also  the  apt  description  of  the  student’s  new  state  of  mind.  For
epidemiologists these 2 × 2 × 2 tables may be rather complex and not quickly discussed,
or,  those  might  be  seen  as  too  simple,  only  drawn  at  home  but  not  quickly  stated  in
papers  for  fear  of  appearing  simplistic.  Admittedly,  issues  of  didactics  and  clarity  are
probably personal  to a  high degree. It would seem though that  clarity  might increase  in
general  if  the  2  ×  2  ×  2  table  already  was  discussed  in  chapter  2  and  was  more  often
stated  in  the  journals.  The  following  discussion  is  a  suggestion  how  those  chapters  2
might look like for books for cross-over economists.
With  reference  to  Schield  (2003),  “Simpson’s  paradox  and  Cornfield’s  conditions”,
Appendix  A  discusses  the  Simpson  paradox  and  Appendix  B  discusses  Schield’s
example  of  Sir  R.A.  Fisher  on  smoking  and  confounding,  and  Cornfield’s  conditions.
The  conditions  by  Cornfield  et  al.  are  sufficient  to  block  a  Simpson  paradox  but  they
may  be  too  strong.  Appendix  C  derives  the  parameters  of  the  crosstable  using  safety
parameters.  Appendix  D  derives  the  parameters  of  the  table  using  average  risk
parameters. Appendix E discusses the risk difference and the Schield plot. Appendix F
discusses  an example from Pearl  (2000) that uses two causes instead of one.  Appendix
G list the routines in Mathematica.
This  paper  is  part  of  the  project  Colignatus,  Th.  (2007e),  “Elementary  statistics  and
causality” (ESAC).
The 2 × 2 × 2 case
The  basic  causal  model  is  a  2  ×  2  ×  2  contingency  table  in  the  order  Effect,  Truth,
Confounding  (ETC),  where  Truth  reflects  the  true  cause  and  Confounding  a  true
confounder.  We  assume  to  know  the  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth  so  we  need  not
worry  about  whether  things  are  different  than  stated.  The  following  is  a  purely
theoretical numerical example.
CT@Default, "ETC"D
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder 75
Ÿ Confounder 7
6
5
Ÿ Success
Confounder 333
Ÿ Confounder 41
386
147
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Note the nomenclature. We already mentioned the point in the Introduction and repeat it
here  because  it  appears  to  be rather  important.  For a  real  variable  x we are  used that  it
has  values  like  3.45  and  1006.4,  and  we  may  easily  write  P(y  |  x)  for  the  conditional
probability  and  be  sloppy  about  the  distinction  between  the  random variable  x  and  the
values  that  it  takes  along  the  real  axis.  Now  for  nominal  variable  Effect  we  have
{Success, ¬Success}, for Truth we have {Cause, ¬Cause} and for Confounding  we have
values  {Confounder,  ¬  Confounder}.  We  can  take  just  single  letter  symbols  too.  For
identification  we  take  the  letter  “F”  for  “ConFounder”.  Thus  we  have  variables  E,  T,
C(-ing) versus values S, C, F and 8 combinations with their negations. But now it makes
quite  a  difference  whether  we  write  P[E  |  T]  or  P[S  |  C]  since  the  first  concerns  the
variables while the second concerns just two of the values that can be taken.
The  numbers  and  their  labels  can  be  shown  in  a  square,  where  we  use  capitals  for
presence and lower case letters  for absence. The rows and columns are like in the table
but the confounder takes the inner diamond.  It is  conceivable to adjust  the sizes of the
surfaces  for  the  actual  weights  but  this  has  not  been programmed and we just  print  the
numbers. 
ETCSquare@D;
75
7
6
5
333
41
386
147
SCF
SCf
ScF
Scf
sCF
sCf
scF
scf
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A taxonomy of confounding
There  appears  to  be  a  rather  sizeable  literature  on  trying  to  find  a  good  definition  for
what “true confounding” is, see for example Pearl (1998), that has become Chapter 6 in
Pearl  (2000).  The  alternative  approach  is  not  to  worry about  “true  confounding”  but  to
create  a  list  of  all  possible  sources  for  confusion.  We  actually  need  a  taxonomy  of
confounding  like  we  already  have  books  on  logical  fallacies,  with  catching  names  like
“post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc”  (when  there  is  smoke  then  there  is  fire),  “ad  hominem”
(playing the person and not the ball), “petitio principii” (begging the question), etcetera.
Above we mentioned already the  core  reason  why we called  one variable  confounding,
i.e. that we by assumption know that one variable with one value is the true cause so that
the other variable must be confounding, so that to find the impact of the cause we have
to consider the situation where the confounder is absent. If we didn’t have this certainty
then we might be unsure about  the order  EXZ or EZX (“confusus directionis”).  But we
might also be unsure about the size of the effect (“confusus magnitudinis”). We can also
identify some other confusions as well: (a) mixing up the ETC analysis with other kinds
of problems in 2 × 2 × 2 tables (“confusus  definitionis”),  such as the case of one cause
and two effects,  (b)  mixing up variables  and values (“confusus  nomenclaturis”).  Below
we will meet some other aspects where we can be confounded on, and collect them in a
basket.
The model
The model consists  of the 8 parameters that  make the entire  table.  We can separate  the
total  number n, and consider  the  remaining 7 probabilities.  All  these  might be taken as
constant  and  thus  worthy of  the  label  of  being a  parameter  in  the  problem at  hand.  All
this  would be a happy state of affairs.  What spoils  this paradise are two snakes: (1) the
proportions of the confounder may not be stable, (2) there are always the “other causes”
(“causes not mentioned”). Given those snakes we want to make sure that our parameters
are really constant. One way to do so is to use conditional probabilities. 
The following definitions  are useful,  with s, c and f  the marginal probabilities,  R and B
the  influence  of  the  cause  on  the  success  and  p  and  q  some  important  conditional
probabilities. (Say, “q”, from “quiet, not-confounding”.)
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Variable Meaning Variable Meaning Variable Meaning
S Success s P@SD R P@S »CD
C Cause c P@CD B P@S » Ÿ CD
F Confounder f P@FD p P@C » FD
q P@C » Ÿ FD
Note that generally p > q since F will be a real confounder. Otherwise you would relabel the case so that bad weather instead of 
good weather becomes the confounder. It is less useful to consider P[F |C] since then we would regard F and S as joint effects 
of C, while for a strong confounder we would not have the idea that it would depend upon C.
The  “probability  to  get  a  success  given  the  cause”  is  often  called  a  “risk”  since  the
success is often an outcome like a disease. If we take the perspective of the 2 × 2 basic
world  where  we  had  only  causes  and  effects,  we  would  take  R  =  P[S  |  C]  as  the
“parameter”  that  gives  the  size  of  the  risk  and  B  =  P[S  |  ¬C]  as  the  “parameter”  that
gives the size of the background risk of “other causes”. We would take them as constant
and then regard them as the driving forces behind the whole process. We would compare
R  and  B  to  the  seeming  risks  from  the  confounder  RF  and  BF .  Note  indeed  that  the
marginal probability  of  the success  can be decomposed as  the background risk plus the
average increment due to the cause, as holds in the 2 × 2 world and still holds in the 2 ×
2 × 2 world.
s = P[S] = P[S, C] + P[S, ¬C]  = R c + B (1 - c) = c HR - BL + B 
s = P[S] = P[S, F] + P[S, ¬F]  = RF  f + BF  (1 - f) = f HRF - BFL + BF  
ETCTable@"ET", c, 8R, B<D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success c R B H1 - cL B H1 - cL+ c R
Ÿ Success c H1 - RL H1 - BL H1 - cL c B- B- c R+ 1
Sum c 1 - c 1
However, in statistical terms R is an average. Of course still R = P[S | C] = P[S, C] / P[C]
but  now  for  both  numerator  and  denominator  we  find  a  statistical  dependence  upon
parameters p and q.
c = P[C] = P[C | F] f + P[C | ¬F] (1 - f) = p f + q (1 - f)
P[S, C] = P[S, C, F] + P[S, C, ¬F] = f[p, q]
As a result of weighing by the probabilities p and q that are related to the confounder we
find: (a) R and B are only averages and not constant  over time,  (b) there arise seeming
risks  so  that  the  success  seems  to  be  related  to  the  confounder.  The  “confusus
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magnitudinis” may come along with  the “confusus  directionis”.  Due to the  confounder,
we cannot just take the average, have to consider the presence of F and ¬F as well, their
relative proportions and their relation to the cause.
The  situation  itself  creates  another  possible  confusion.  Let  us  call  it  the  “confusus
contributionis”.  It  may  well  be  that  the  confounder  has  no  direct  influence  on  the
disease,  so  that  it  is  not  a  causal  factor  per  se.  But  it  may  very  well  be  that  the
confounder has a direct influence on the proportion of the population at risk. One might
call this a causal influence as well. Or not. It depends upon the situation and our state of
confusion.  For some events it  may come as  a surprise that  we need to control  for  some
characteristic  and  then  that  characteristic  might  be  seen  as  a  “causal  factor”.  For  some
other events it might be obvious that it matters how the risk population is composed (e.g.
males versus females) and then we might not think of this as “causal factor” but rather as
a Simpson paradox. 
The  distribution  of  Truth  and  Confounding  (summing over  Effect)  thus  has  parameters
or variables p and q (parameters only when those are statistical regularities).
ETCTable@"TC", f, 8p, q<D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder f p f H1 - pL f
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q H1 - f L H1 - qL 1 - f
Sum f p + H1 - f L q - f p + f q - q + 1 1
Note  that  p = q = c if  and only  if  c  and  f  are  statistically  independent  (check the  inner
matrix).  Since  c  is  the  independent  factor,  statistical  independence  means  that  we  can
substitute  p  = q  = c.  When  there  is  no  statistical  independence  then  we  may eliminate
one  variate,  and  the  question  arises  whether  this  should  be  p,  q  or  f.  It  appears  most
useful to eliminate p since we may take q and the absence of the confounder as the norm
situation while it is useful to control f.
Solve@c ä p f + q H1 - fL, pD
::p Ø c + f q - qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
>>
From our definition of the case we must regard the distribution of truth, i.e. {c, 1 - c} for
{C,  ¬  C},  as  the  “driving”  distribution,  either  from  observation  or  controlled
(influenced)  by  experiment.  If  there  would  be  a  causal  relationship  between  cause  and
confounder (e.g. a common cause) so that p and q indeed are parameters then we would
make  another  model.  In  the  simplest  case  f  has  its  own  causes  so  that  the  relation
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between  c  and  f  is  only  “statistical”.  It  would  be  too  simple  to  assume  that  Truth  and
Confounding  are  distributed  independently,  and  we  allow  for  some  statistical  random
effects.  The  distributions  would  rather  be  such  that  we  might  also  think  that  the
confounder is the cause, so that we really suffer  the question whether we can determine
conditions such that a seeming cause can be exposed as a confounder.
Notation in Mathematica 
In  the  discussion  below  there  will  be  computer  output  from  routines  in  Mathematica.
The following is a small legend for reading that output. The R and B are on the left hand
side  while  p  and  q  are  on  the  right  hand  side.  If  the  latter  would  deserve  the  name  of
being  parameters  (constant,  unchanging)  then  one  might  consider  that  the  Confounder
caused  the  Cause.  Yet,  for  now  these  are  just  statistical  observations,  just  as  the
mentioned risks.
ETCPrTable@D
Risk Probability
1 ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderD
2 ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseD ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderD
Note that the above must be read as expressions for constants f[x0 | y0] and not as for variables f[x | y]. Since Truth ranges over 
{Cause, ¬Cause}, the above conditional probabilities don’t depend upon Truth but upon its value Cause and ¬Cause.
Parameters from further conditionalizing
When we conditionalize further then we may find quantities that we might assume to be
really constant so that they deserve the status of being a parameter.
The  parameter  of  interest  actually  is  r  =  P[S  |  C,  ¬F],  the  conditional  risk  when  the
confounder is absent. Similarly, b = P[S | ¬C, ¬F] for the background risk. If b = 0 then
the cause would be a “simple cause”, meaning that the effect only arises when the cause
is present. 
Coming from a two-variable world we are confounded about the size of the effect when
R ∫ r and B ∫ b.
This  shows a  crucial  distinction  between the ETC contingency table  and other  kinds of
contingency tables. In other kinds of tables we have for example political preference for
“Party  A”,  “Party  B” and  Party  C”,  and  then  the  change from one cell  to  another  does
not  necessarily  have  a  causal  connotation.  For  the  ETC table  the  absence  of  the  cause
and / or the confounder have implications of huge importance, since they allow the direct
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identification  of  the  individual  effects.  This  identification  of  course  is  under  the
assumption  that  we  know the  truth,  and  in  practice  we  have  tables  EXZ and  EZX and
have to compare them. But for now we just have one ETC. Thus, in terms of confouding,
we now also have the “confusus causalitatis”,  holding that we might confuse an issue of
mere association (any kind of contingency table)  with an analysis of causality (the ETC
case).  The  Simpson paradox  (Appendix  A)  works  differently  depending  upon  whether
we  do  a  causal  analysis  in  which  the  absence  of  the  confounder  has  direct  import  or
whether we do an investigation into mere association.
Before  delving  deeper  into  the  formulas  it  will  be  useful  to  do  the  basic  statistical
analysis  of  the  example  contingency  model,  so  that  we  can  already  recognize  the
variables that we have been introducing here: n, s, c, f, p, q, r, b, R, B, RF  and BF .
The basic statistical analysis
The basic statistical  analysis consists  of identifying the proper conditional probabilities.
In  the  following  output,  there  are  three  tables  that  give  the  border-matrices  for  two
variables  only.  Of  the  four  tables,  the  second  one  gives  a  rated  table  that  will  require
some explanation below. The first  table gives the relation between cause and effect that
gives  the  average  R  and  B  from  our  two-variable  world.  The  fourth  table  gives  the
seeming  relation  with  seeming  RF  and  RB  that  would  arise  if  we  would  take  the
confouder as the cause.
† This takes the defaul CT[Data] derived from the table that has been set above. 
The routine also produces formal output, that is useful in this format for other 
routines to recognize the output. We can run another small routine to translate 
that output to human form. Note that you could easily suppress the formal 
output by putting a colon behind the call. Presently it is useful to show all 
output. There is also other output that we will discuss subsequently.
Hres1 = Report@ExampleD = ETCStatistics@D êê NL êê MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success 82 11 93
Ÿ Success 374 533 907
Sum 456 544 1000
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
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Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success 0.035 0.025 0.06
Ÿ Success 0.205 0.735 0.94
Sum 0.24 0.76 1.
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder 408 392 800
Ÿ Confounder 48 152 200
Sum 456 544 1000
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
Confounder Ÿ Confounder Total
Success 81 12 93
Ÿ Success 719 188 907
Sum 800 200 1000
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N Ø 1000.
NSuccessØ 93.
NCauseØ 456.
NConfounder Ø 800.
MarginalPrHSuccessL Ø 0.093
MarginalPrHCauseL Ø 0.456
MarginalPrHConfounderL Ø 0.8
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø False
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø False
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ False
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.145833
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.0328947
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.183824
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.0153061
Risk Ø
i
k
jj 0.183824 0.0153061
0.145833 0.0328947
y
{
zz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø 0.179825
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ 0.0202206
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ 0.51
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.24
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ 0.10125
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.06
RRiskHTrueL Ø 4.43333
RRiskHCauseLØ 8.89314
RelativePrHConfounderLØ 2.125
RRiskHSeemingL Ø 1.6875
Conditions Ø 8True, True, True, True, True<
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.854167
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.967105
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.816176
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.984694
SafetyØ
i
k
jj 0.816176 0.984694
0.854167 0.967105
y
{
zz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jj False False
False False
y
{
zz
ETCSimpsonØ 8NecessaryØ False, SufficientØ 8True, True, False<<
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
Epidemiology concentrates  on  the relative  risks.  The  true relative  risk is  4.4 but  due to
the  confounder  the  average  relative  risk  is  8.9.  If  we  would  be  confused  about  what
would be the true cause then we would think that the average relative risk was 1.7.
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ETCRiskTable[res1]
Name Value Name Value Name Value
Cause r 0.145833 R 0.179825 Rf 0.10125
Background b 0.0328947 B 0.0202206 Bf 0.06
Difference r - b 0.112939 R - B 0.159604 Rf - Bf 0.04125
Ratio r ê b 4.43333 R ê B 8.89314 Rf ê Bf 1.6875
In  the  output  of  the  ETCStatistics  routine  we  find  these  conditions  tested  (see  also  the
discussion below where the safety parameters are introduced):
(a) on risk: (1) r > b, (2) R > B, (3) p ¥ q, (4) RF  ¥ BF , (5) p / q ¥ RF  / BF .
(b) on safety: {{w = 0,  v = 1}, {e = 1 - r = 0 or r  = 1,  a = 1 - b = 1 or b = 0 }} (left
column should be 0, right column should be 1).
In  this  discussion  the  seeming relative  risk  is  important  since  we  should  allow that  we
don’t have EXZ but EZX. The average outcome on the seeming risk may be a give-away.
It  might  be  confusing  if  we  were  to  present  both  tables  for  EXZ  and  EZX  in  one
presentation so that it better to make separate runs (see below).
Regression coefficients
The  identified  risks  can  be  compared  to  regression  coefficients  in  a  linear  regression,
since  they  express  the  contribution  of  a  single  causal  event  to  the  success.  Yet,  the
discussion on regression coefficients is a bit more complex since events do not just come
all  by  themselves,  and  are  always  classified  in  a  table  in  more  dimensions.  The
element-regression  coefficients  should  also  be  distinguished  from the  vector-regression
coefficients that arise when a unit of Truth is observed, as the vector {c, 1 - c}. This is an
issue  to  return  to  later.  For  now the  following  points  are  useful  to  keep in  the  back of
your mind:
(1) When we have more observations, distinguished by time period (such as a year), then
it might make sense not to aggregate all data as s = P[S] = P[S, C] + P[S, ¬C]  = R c + B
(1 - c) = c HR - BL + B = b + d c but to run a regression like st  = b + d ct  + et  weighed by
the  numbers.  This  would  give  the  weighed risk  coefficients  or  the  weighed conditional
probabilities.  That  we  can  do  this  confirms  that  we  can  understand  the  conditional
probabilities  as  regression  coefficients.  The  angle  is  important.  (1a)  We  can  further
develop the regression model with more variables and parameters. (1b) We can locate an
influence of time. Time is a “great confounder” and it would be usefully included in our
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analysis. (1c) Above regression is only on s and not on 1 - s. Above regression with c, R,
B and the addition to 1 fully explains the situation, but perhaps including the error on 1 -
s gives a different  estimate.  If there are more values, also with confounding, it  is useful
to observe the inner elements of the tables and not just the margins, and to also use those
observations. See the discussion on safety below.
(2)  Of course the coefficients  are unstable  when we don’t have the true model with the
true fixed coefficients. This is why we would have this “confusus magnitudinis”.
(3)  Bayesians  tend  to  think  in  terms  of  conditional  probabilities  and  create  the  joint
distributions from those. It may be that they just think in terms of regression coefficients.
That method only holds when you use the proper fixed coefficients.
(4)  For  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  the  regression  coefficient  is  related  to  the
correlation  coefficient  by  d  =  r  sy  /  sx.  Taking  just  Bernouilli  we  might  take  sy  =è!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
s H1- sL  and  sx  =  è!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!c H1 - cL ,  and  then  have  our  rSC.  Again,  it  would  not  be  stable
under confouding. And, again, this example would concern just a value of a variable and
not  the  variable  itself,  so  we should  be clear  about  what  kind of  correlation  coefficient
we want.
Other parameters that cause a success
Above,  we  identified  r  and  b  by  means  of  conditionalizing.  We  first  did  the  basic
statistical  analysis  to  show  that  this  was  a  fruitful  approach,  and,  to  prevent  that  you
were  lost  in  the  formulas.  Now that  we have seen  some data  and statistics,  it  will  be  a
good moment to continue the formal analysis.
The data matrix contains two rows with a success, and we have only looked at one row,
where  the  confounder  is  not  present.  When  we  take  the  row  where  the  confounder  is
present as well then we might attribute the change of the risk just to that confounder.
† This takes the success part of the data matrix and conditionalizes it. This is the 
small risk matrix that is printed in the output of the ETCStatistics routine. By 
symmetry, the background risk when F is present is the rF  if we would take the 
confounder as the real cause. The double-struck  gives the risk when both 
factors are present.
88P@S » C, FD, P@S » ÿ C, FD<, 8P@S » C, ÿ FD, P@S » ÿ C, ÿ FD<< == 88, rF<, 8r, b<<
i
k
jj PHS »C, FL PHS »Ÿ C, FL
PHS »C, Ÿ FL PHS »Ÿ C, Ÿ FL
y
{
zz  ik
jj  rF
r b
y
{
zz
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For the current model it would be strange that  > r or rF  > b. The idea of F is that it is a
confounder  and  thus  has  no  real  influence.  If  the  differences  from  r  and  b  are
importantly different  from zero (and possibly even negative !) then a good reason needs
to  be  given.  One  obvious  explanation  is  that  the  success  has  not  been  measured
correctly. But if the confounder e.g. is the distinction between Male and Female then one
can imagine group specific risks.
What about the absence of the effect ?
Epidemiology focusses  on  the  success,  the  disease.  Yet,  half  of  the  cells  are  about  the
absence of the success. While writing this paper this author was for a long time entirely
focussed  on  understanding  and  re-creating  what  the  epidemiologists  were  doing,  and
thus focussed as well on the risks and not the safety. This tunnel vision might be called
the “confusus focis ad risces”. Taking some distance from the risks, it appears that these
safety parameters are important for a proper causal explanation.
† This takes the safety (or failure) part of the data matrix and conditionalizes it. 
This is the small safety matrix that is printed in the output of the ETCStatistics 
routine.
88P@ÿ S » C, FD, P@ÿ S » ÿ C, FD<, 8P@ÿ S » C, ÿ FD, P@ÿ S » ÿ C, ÿ FD<< ==
88w, v<, 8e, a<<
i
k
jj PHŸ S »C, FL PHŸ S »Ÿ C, FL
PHŸ S »C, Ÿ FL PHŸ S »Ÿ C, Ÿ FL
y
{
zz  ik
jj w v
e a
y
{
zz
Let u = P[¬C, ¬F] = P[¬S, ¬C, ¬F] + P[S, ¬C, ¬F] so that dividing both sides by u gives
1 = P[¬S | ¬C, ¬F]  + P[S | ¬C, ¬F]. Hence a = 1 - b and in the same way we find that e =
1 - r.
What  is  important:  (i)  we  now  see  that  r  and  b  have  consequences  with  a  safety
interpretation,  (ii)  that  v  and w may be  more sensible  parameters  than  rF  and  .  Those
may namely be related more to C and ¬C and less to this specific F. 
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† This gives the part for ¬S. Substraction from the total gives the part for S. Note 
that p can be eliminated as a function of c, f and q. In fact, we now have 
parameterized the whole contingency table (including the additition to 1).
ETCTable@"-S»TC", 8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D
Cause Ÿ Cause
Confounder Hc - H1 - f L qLw f I1 - c-H1- f L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
M v
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q H1 - rL H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
Sum H1 - f L q H1 - rL+ Hc- H1 - f L qLw H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL + f I1 - c-H1- f L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
We can also deduce R and B, see Appendix C and Appendix D:
ETCAverageRisksFromSafety@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D
:-w+ H1 - f L q Hr+w - 1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
+ 1,
b H f - 1L Hq - 1L + H-c+ f H1 - qL + qL H1 - vL
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
1 - c
>
In the special case that p = q  = c then:
R  = r (1 - f) + (1 - w) f
B  = b (1 - f) + (1 - v) f
There are two cases to consider, identifiable as the columns in the small matrix of safety
parameters:
(1) When the cause is not present then the situation should be totally safe (right column).
   †  If C is the only possible cause of S and it is a simple cause that always has 
effect then its absence should give full safety, v = a = 1. 
   †  a = P[¬S | ¬C, ¬F] = 1 - b = background safety in total absence. If there is a 
background risk such that b ∫ 0 then the background safety is reduced by the 
same amount. 
   †  v = P[¬S | ¬C, F] = safety (using “v” from Dutch “veiligheid”, the “s” already 
taken). 
   †  Normally v < a since including the confounder should reduce safety.
   †  If those equalities don’t hold, then normally v  < 1 and a  < 1, and then there 
would be other factors that cause people to be less safe. If blocking C does not 
enhance full safety then one wouldn’t call C a “simple cause” but rather a 
“contributing factor”. To get a simple cause, we would redefine the absence of 
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the cause as “absence of the original cause plus the presence of a truly effective 
block for other causes”.
(2) The following are curious situations since the cause is present but there is no success
(left column).
   †  If C is a simple cause of S then w = e = 0. Note that e  = 0 means r  = 1, another 
condition for a simple cause.
   †  e = P[¬S | C, ¬F] = exceptional (no confounder)
   †  w = P[¬S | C, F] = miraculous (“wunderbar”, the “m” normally is an integer) 
(even the confounder present)
   †  Normally w < e since including the confounder should reduce safety.
   †  Normally w < v since including the cause should reduce safety (and it is 
miraculous when w ∫ 0).
   †  If those equalities don’t hold, and thus if the cause is present but the effect does 
not show, then something might actually be blocking the cause. For a “simple 
cause” we would redefine the cause as “unblocked cause”, and recalculate the 
table. But if it concerns only a “contributing factor” then there is no miracle, 
since that concept allows that the cause does not always result into a success.
In Appendix A we derive the necessary conditions for the Simpson paradox that b < r <
1 - v < 1 - w, which translates too as w < v < 1 - r.  For a causal process to get closer to
the  simple  causal  model  we  would  require  that  w  Ø  0,  v  Ø  1  and  r  Ø  1.  The  causal
model requires that v Ø 1 while the Simpson paradox requires that v Ø 0. Under normal
causal assumptions the Simpson paradox could not exist. 
Reconstruction using safety
The  former section  mentioned that  we have parameterized the  whole  2 × 2 × 2 matrix.
See Appendix C for the actual deduction. The following shows how it works. From the
7 parameters and the summation to 1 the contingency table  is  created.  It may be scaled
up by multiplication with some n. 
lis = SafetyToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D;
2007-05-29-ETC222-45.nb 19
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder Hc - H1 - f L qL H1 -wL
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q r
H-c+ f H1 - qL + qL H1 - vL
b H1 - f L H1 - qL
Ÿ Success
Confounder Hc - H1 - f L qLw
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q H1 - rL
H-c+ f H1 - qL + qL v
H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
† Contingency tables actually only contain natural numbers but we have disabled 
a warning message on that. Note that in the output r ã R reads not as a 
declaration (where the LHS value is set) but as a condition that must evaluate 
to True or False. The output contains other conditions that we will discuss 
shortly.
Hres = ETCStatistics@lis, N Æ FalseD L êê Simplify êê MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success -w c+ c- H f - 1L q Hr+w - 1L b H f - 1L Hq - 1L+ Hc + f Hq - 1L - qL Hv-
Ÿ Success c w+ H f - 1L q Hr+w- 1L H-c+ f - f q + qL v- Hb - 1L H f - 1L Hq -
Sum c 1 - c
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success q r b - b q -q b + b + q r
Ÿ Success q - q r Hb - 1L Hq - 1L b Hq - 1L- q r+ 1
Sum q 1 - q 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder c+ H f - 1L q -c+ f - f q + q f
Ÿ Confounder q - f q H f - 1L Hq - 1L 1 - f
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
Confounder Ÿ Confounder
Success Hc- qL Hv-wL+ f HHq - 1L v- q w+ 1L H f - 1L Hb Hq - 1L- q rL
Ÿ Success q Hv-wL + c Hw- vL+ f H-q v + v+ q wL -H f - 1L Hb Hq - 1L - q r+ 1L
Sum f 1 - f
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ik
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
N Ø 1
NSuccessØ b H f - 1L Hq - 1L+ q r+ c v- q v- c w+ q w- f Hv+ q Hr- v +wL- 1L
NCauseØ c
NConfounder Ø f
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø c-qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
 0
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø Hc+H f -1L qL Hr+w-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
 0
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ Hc+ f Hq-1L-qL Hb+v-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c-1
 0
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ r
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ b
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 1 -w
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 1 - v
Risk Ø
i
k
jj 1 -w 1 - v
r b
y
{
zz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø -wc+c-H f -1L q Hr+w-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ b H-q f + f +q-1L-Hc+ f Hq-1L-qL Hv-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c-1
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ c+H f -1L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ q
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ Hc-qL Hv-wL+ f HHq-1L v-q w+1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ -q b + b + q r
RRiskHTrueL Ø rÅÅÅÅ
b
RRiskHCauseLØ Hc-1L Hc Hw-1L+H f -1L q Hr+w-1LLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c Hb H f -1L Hq-1L+Hc+ f Hq-1L-qL Hv-1LL
RelativePrHConfounderLØ c+H f -1L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f q
RRiskHSeemingL Ø Hc-qL Hv-wL+ f HHq-1L v-q w+1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-q b+b+q rL
Conditions Ø 9r > b, -wc+c-H f-1L q Hr+w-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
> b H-q f + f +q-1L-Hc+ f Hq-1L-qL Hv-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅ
c-1
,
c-qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
¥ 0, Hc-qL Hv-wL+ f Hb q-ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - r
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - b
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ w
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ v
SafetyØ
i
k
jjw v
1 - r 1 - b
y
{
zz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jjw  0 v  1
r  1 b  0
y
{
zz
ETCSimpsonØ 9NecessaryØ b  r  1 - v  1 -w, SufficientØ 9v > w, r > b, b H-q f + f +q-1L-Hc+ f HÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c-1
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ETCRiskTable@resD êê Rationalize êê Simplify
Name Value Name Value
Cause r r R
-wc+c-H f -1L q Hr+w-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
Background b b B
b H-q f + f +q-1L-Hc+ f Hq-1L-qL Hv-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c-1
Difference r - b r- b R - B b H f -1L Hq-1L+Hc+ f Hq-1L-qL Hv-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c-1
+ -wc+c-H f -1L q Hr+w-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
Ratio r ê b rÅÅÅÅ
b
R ê B Hc-1L Hc Hw-1L+H f -1L q Hr+w-1LLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c Hb H f -1L Hq-1L+Hc+ f Hq-1L-qL Hv-1LL
The  seeming relative  risk simplifies  a  bit  when we eliminate  c.  This  cannot  be done in
the routine since it does not know p as an independent variable.
psub = RRisk@"Seeming"D ê. res ê. c Æ p f + H1 - fL q êê Simplify
Hp - 1L v- p w+ 1
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
-q b + b + q r
When the ETC model is most powerful
Deliberately, we started with a matrix such that r ∫ 1 and b ∫ 0, since those are common
applications.  Yet,  those  situations  also  allow  vagueness  about  the  causality.  The
so-called  cause  then  is  actually  a  contributing  factor  only.  The  ETC  model  is  most
powerful when we consider a “simple cause” since then we can impose strong conditions
on the parameters of the matrix. A cause is a simple cause when the success is recorded
if and only if the cause has occurred. Discussions gain in clarity if causal chains can be
broken down to  those relations.  Admittedly, models will  always refer  to “other causes”
since  it  could  well  be  impossible  to  exclude  everything  else.  Probably  the  supreme
counterfactual  is  to assume that  there  are no “other  causes”.  Yet  in prediction  we often
substitute  e  =  0  and  then  we  eliminate  those  other  causes.  (Perhaps  the  human mind is
continuously  in  the  state  of  that  supreme counterfactual,  since modelling requires  us  to
neglect  things.  The  only  thing  that  saves  us  is  the  ability  to  quickly  switch  to  another
model.)
† We also assume that cause and confounder are distributed independently.
lis = SafetyToETCArray@8c, 1, 0<, 8f, c<, 80, 1<D;
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TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder c - c H1 - f L
Ÿ Confounder c H1 - f L
0
0
Ÿ Success
Confounder 0
Ÿ Confounder 0
H1 - cL f
H1 - cL H1 - f L
† The confounder is exposed by having a relative risk of 1.
Hres = ETCStatistics@lis, N Æ FalseD L êê Simplify êê MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success c 0 c
Ÿ Success 0 1 - c 1 - c
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success c 0 c
Ÿ Success 0 1 - c 1 - c
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder c f f - c f f
Ÿ Confounder c- c f Hc- 1L H f - 1L 1 - f
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
Confounder Ÿ Confounder Total
Success c f c- c f c
Ÿ Success f - c f Hc - 1L H f - 1L 1 - c
Sum f 1 - f 1
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N Ø 1
NSuccessØ c
NCauseØ c
NConfounder Ø f
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø True
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø True
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ True
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 1
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0
Risk Ø
i
k
jj 1 0
1 0
y
{
zz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø 1
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ 0
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ c
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ c
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ c
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ c
RRiskHTrueL Ø¶
RRiskHCauseLØ ¶
RelativePrHConfounderLØ 1
RRiskHSeemingL Ø 1
Conditions Ø 8True, True, True, True, True<
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 1
SafetyØ
i
k
jj 0 1
0 1
y
{
zz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jj True True
True True
y
{
zz
ETCSimpsonØ 8NecessaryØ False, SufficientØ 8True, True, False<<
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
ETCRiskTable@resD êê Rationalize êê Simplify
Name Value Name Value Name Value
Cause r 1 R 1 Rf c
Background b 0 B 0 Bf c
Difference r - b 1 R - B 1 Rf - Bf 0
Ratio r ê b ComplexInfinity R ê B ComplexInfinity Rf ê Bf 1
Selecting some parameter values shows us this layout in the ETC square.
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ETCSquare@lis 100 ê. 8c Æ 0.3, f Æ 0.8<D;
24.
6.
0
0
0
0
56.
14.
SCF
SCf
ScF
Scf
sCF
sCf
scF
scf
Formal analysis on the risk approach
Above  we  took  the  safety  parameters  as  the  keys  for  reconstructing  the  contingency
table.  We  might  also  focus  on  risk  and  perform  a  different  parameterization.  When
writing  this  article,  this  was  actually  the  first  result.  But  the  approach  with  the  safety
parameters  is  most  insightful  and  deserved  the  top  position  in  the  discussion  above.
Now, however, it is proper to also consider the risk parameterization.
Instead of these averages we are interested in the driving risks (using above TC table):
r = P[S | C, ¬F] = P[S, C, ¬F] / (P[C | ¬F] P[¬F]) = P[S, C, ¬F] / (q (1 - f))
b = P[S | ¬C, ¬F] = P[S, ¬C, ¬F] / (P[¬C | ¬F] P[¬F]) = P[S, ¬C, ¬F] / ((1 - q) (1
- f))
And  this  allows  us  to  understand  what  happens  in  general  when  the  confounder  is  not
present:
P[S, C | ¬F] = P[S, C, ¬F] / P[¬F] =  r q
P[S, ¬C | ¬F] = P[S, ¬C, ¬F] / P[¬F] =  b (1 - q)
When  we  consider  the  group  ¬F as  a  whole,  conditionally,  then  we  find  the  following
table - which is also the second table printed in the above ETCStatistics  output (i.e.  the
Ratio table).
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† This looks only at the group with ¬F. All values must be multiplied by 1 - f.
ETCTable@"ET", q, 8r, b<D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success q r b H1 - qL b H1 - qL+ q r
Ÿ Success q H1 - rL H1 - bL H1 - qL q b - b - q r+ 1
Sum q 1 - q 1
If  we multiply this  with  1 - f  and substract  this  result  from the  earlier  total,  we get  the
matrix for  the group with F. Hence we have parameterized the  whole 2 × 2 × 2 matrix
again.  See  Appendix  D  for  a  review.  In  this  parameterization  R and  B are  retained  as
input parameters even though they are the outcome of the causal process. It can be useful
to have this flexibility for creating contingency tables.
Reconstruction using average risks
The following creates a contingency table from the average risks. From the 7 parameters
and the summation to 1 the matrix is created. It may be scaled up by multiplication with
some  n.  When  the  matrix  is  submitted  to  the  routine  for  the  statistics  then  we  get  the
proper results that fit the earlier tables.
† Note that we include R and B as variable. In empirical observation these are 
outcomes but table designers like us will want to control how the table will 
look like. 
lis = RiskToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8R, B<D;
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder c R - H1 - f L q r
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q r
B H1 - cL- b H1 - f L H1 - qL
b H1 - f L H1 - qL
Ÿ Success
Confounder c H1 - RL- H1 - f L q H1 - rL
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q H1 - rL
H1 -BL H1 - cL - H1 - bL H1 - f L H1
H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
† The statistics routine takes the matrix as it is and its origin does not matter. 
The advantage of the risk parameterization is that we now recognize more 
output. For example, s was unrecognizable before but now simplifies to s = B 
+ c (R - B).
Hres = ETCStatistics@lis, N Æ FalseD L êê Simplify êê MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
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Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success c R B- B c -c B +B + c R
Ÿ Success c - c R HB- 1L Hc- 1L B Hc- 1L - c R+ 1
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success q r b - b q -q b + b + q r
Ÿ Success q - q r Hb - 1L Hq - 1L b Hq - 1L- q r+ 1
Sum q 1 - q 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder c+ H f - 1L q -c+ f - f q + q f
Ÿ Confounder q - f q H f - 1L Hq - 1L 1 - f
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
Confounder Ÿ Confounder
Success -c B+ B+ b H-q f + f + q - 1L+ f q r- q r+ c R H f - 1L Hb Hq - 1L- q r
Ÿ Success B Hc- 1L+ f + b H f - 1L Hq - 1L- f q r+ q r - c R -H f - 1L Hb Hq - 1L - q
Sum f 1 - f
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N Ø 1
NSuccessØ -c B+ B+ c R
NCauseØ c
NConfounder Ø f
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø c-qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
 0
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø r  R
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ b  B
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ r
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ b
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ H f -1L q r+c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+H f-1L q
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ B Hc-1L+b H f -1L Hq-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ f Hq-1L-q
Risk Ø
i
k
jjjj
H f -1L q r+c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+H f-1L q
B Hc-1L+b H f -1L Hq-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ f Hq-1L-q
r b
y
{
zzzz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø R
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ B
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ c+H f -1L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ q
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ -c B+B+b H-q f + f +q-1L+ f q r-q r+c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ -q b + b + q r
RRiskHTrueL Ø rÅÅÅÅ
b
RRiskHCauseLØ RÅÅÅÅÅ
B
RelativePrHConfounderLØ c+H f -1L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f q
RRiskHSeemingL Ø -c B+B+b H-q f + f +q-1L+ f q r-q r+c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-q b+b+q rL
Conditions Ø 9r > b, R > B, c-qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
¥ 0, -c B+B+b Hq-1L-q r+c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
¥ 0, b c Hq-1L+q H-c B+B+c HR-rLLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f q Hb Hq-1L-q rL ¥ 0=
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - r
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - b
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ -R c+c+q H-r f + f +r-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+H f -1L q
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ -c B+B+c- f+ f q-q+b H-q f + f +q-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ f Hq-1L-q
SafetyØ
i
k
jjjj
-R c+c+q H-r f + f +r-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+H f -1L q
-c B+B+c- f + f q-q+b H-q f + f +q-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ f Hq-1L-q
1 - r 1 - b
y
{
zzzz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jjjj
H f -1L q Hr-1L+c HR-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+H f -1L q  0
B Hc-1L+b H f -1L Hq-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ f Hq-1L-q  0
r  1 b  0
y
{
zzzz
ETCSimpsonØ 9NecessaryØ b  r  B Hc-1L+b H f -1L Hq-1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ f Hq-1L-q 
H f -1L q r+c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+H f -1L q , SufficientØ 9 -c B+B+c- f + f qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅc+ f
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ETCRiskTable@resD êê Rationalize êê Simplify
Name Value Name Value Name Value
Cause r r R R Rf
-c B+B+b H-q f + f +q-1L+ f q r-q r+cÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
Background b b B B Bf -q b + b + q r
Difference r - b r- b R - B R- B Rf - Bf -c B+B+b Hq-1L-q r+c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
Ratio r ê b rÅÅÅÅ
b
R ê B RÅÅÅÅÅ
B
Rf ê Bf -c B+B+b H-q f + f +q-1L+ f q r-q r+cÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-q b+b+q rL
The seeming relative risk does not simplify when we eliminate c. 
psub = RRisk@"Seeming"D ê. res ê. c Æ p f + q H1 - fL êê Simplify
b H f - 1L Hq - 1L+ B H f p - f q + q - 1L - f q r+ q r- f p R+ f q R- q R
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f Hb Hq - 1L - q rL
PM. If we calculate R and B from the safety parameters and use these to create the table
again, then we get the same results. See Appendix D.
Intermediate conclusions
It will help to summarize what we have done up to now so that we can use that as a base
for the subsequent discussion.
  1.  We designed a statistics routine that analyzes a count data contingency table 
into the various marginal and conditional probabilities.
  2.  We identified the proper risk and safety parameters, as opposed to statistical 
averages.
  3.  We designed a routine to create a contingency table with count data, by 
reverse-engineering from true parameters.
  4.  We designed another routine to reverse-engineer but using average risks.
  5.  We identified conditions {r, b} = {1, 0} and {w, v} = {1, 0} for when the cause 
can be called a “simple cause” (a success if and only if a cause). These value 
imply relative freedom or conditional independence, but not conversely. If those 
values are not present then the cause is not a simple cause anymore, just a 
“contributing factor”.
  6.  We identified interdepencies between parameters and variables: (6a) p depends 
upon other more useful parameters, (6b) we cannot set the safety parameters and 
the averages at the same time.
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  7.  We identified when the distributions of cause and confounder would be 
statistically independent (p = q = c).
For  the  following,  we  will  delve  deeper  into  the  issue  of  statistical  independence.  It
appears  that epidemiology uses this  standardly as a frame of reference.  Epidemiologists
also focus on the relation between {r, b} and {R, B}. To link up to the literature  it  will
be  useful  to  consider  independence  while  using  the  parameterization  of
RiskToETCArray instead of SafetyToETCArray.
Considering the case when p = q = c
To what extent are p and q really “parameters” ? Or, to what extent are they merely the
product of sampling in a perhaps random reality ? There are two key solution approaches:
   †  The cause and confounder are statistically independent. Then p = q = c. 
   †  The cause and confounder are statistically dependent. It may just be the case 
that the numbers suggest a relation even though there isn’t one (since we are 
discussing a true confouder). It p and q have stable values and indeed are 
parametric rather than f itself, then f = (c - q) / (p - q). (PM. If one substitutes p 
= q then they are equal to c again; then f seems indeterminate, but it isn’t, since f 
is given from the marginal. Only if p ∫ q and if we regard them as parameters 
then and only then we solve f = (c - q) / (p - q).) 
The general approach thus is to allow for both dependence and independence, where the
researcher must provide a statistical explanation when the variables and the distributions
{c, 1 - c} and {f, 1 - f} are dependent.
The following sets p = q = c.
lis = RiskToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, c<, 8R, B<D;
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD êê Simplify
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder c HH f - 1L r+ RL
Ÿ Confounder -c H f - 1L r
-Hc- 1L HB + b H f - 1LL
b Hc- 1L H f - 1L
Ÿ Success
Confounder c H-r f + f + r -RL
Ÿ Confounder c H f - 1L Hr - 1L
Hc- 1L HB + b H f - 1L- f L
-Hb - 1L Hc- 1L H f - 1L
Hres = ETCStatistics@lis, N Æ FalseD êê SimplifyL êê MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
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Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success c R B- B c -c B +B + c R
Ÿ Success c - c R HB- 1L Hc- 1L B Hc- 1L - c R+ 1
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success c r b - b c -c b + b + c r
Ÿ Success c - c r Hb - 1L Hc- 1L b Hc - 1L- c r+ 1
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder c f f - c f f
Ÿ Confounder c- c f Hc- 1L H f - 1L 1 - f
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
Confounder Ÿ Confounder
Success -c B+ B+ b H- f c + c+ f - 1L + c HH f - 1L r+ RL H f - 1L Hb Hc- 1L - c rL
Ÿ Success B Hc- 1L+ b H f - 1L Hc- 1L + f + c r- c f r- c R -H f - 1L Hb Hc - 1L- c
Sum f 1 - f
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N Ø 1
NSuccessØ -c B+ B+ c R
NCauseØ c
NConfounder Ø f
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø True
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø r  R
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ b  B
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ r
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ b
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ H f -1L r+RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ B+b H f -1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
Risk Ø
i
k
jjjj
H f -1L r+RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
B+b H f -1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
r b
y
{
zzzz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø R
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ B
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ c
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ c
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ -c B+B+b H- f c+c+ f -1L+c HH f -1L r+RLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ -c b + b + c r
RRiskHTrueL Ø rÅÅÅÅ
b
RRiskHCauseLØ RÅÅÅÅÅ
B
RelativePrHConfounderLØ 1
RRiskHSeemingL Ø -c B+B+b H- f c+c+ f -1L+c HH f -1L r+RLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-c b+b+c rL
Conditions Ø 9r > b, R > B, True, -c B+B+b Hc-1L+c HR-rLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
¥ 0, -c b+b+B Hc-1L+c Hr-RLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-c b+b+c rL ¥ 0=
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - r
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - b
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ -r f + f +r-RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ - f b+b-B+ fÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
SafetyØ
i
k
jjjj
-r f + f +r-RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
- f b+b-B+ fÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
1 - r 1 - b
y
{
zzzz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jjjj
f Hr-1L-r+RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
 0
B+b H f -1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
 0
r  1 b  0
y
{
zzzz
ETCSimpsonØ 9NecessaryØ b  r  B+b H f -1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
 H f -1L r+RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
, SufficientØ 9 - f b+b-B+ f r-r+RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
> 0, r >
The difference with the former result on risk is in the last column.
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ETCRiskTable@resD êê Rationalize êê Simplify
Name Value Name Value Name Value
Cause r r R R Rf
-c B+B+b H- f c+c+ f -1L+c HH f -1L r+ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
Background b b B B Bf -c b + b + c r
Difference r - b r- b R - B R- B Rf - Bf -c B+B+b Hc-1L+c HR-rLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
Ratio r ê b rÅÅÅÅ
b
R ê B RÅÅÅÅÅ
B
Rf ê Bf -c B+B+b H- f c+c+ f -1L+c HH f -1L r+ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-c b+b+c rL
The seeming relative  risk RF  /  BF  does not  simplify, and becomes more complex if we
would substitute c.
RRisk@"Seeming"D ê. res êê Simplify
-c B+ B+ b H- f c+ c + f - 1L+ c HH f - 1L r+ RL
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-c b + b + c rL
Conditional independence or relative freedom
In our two-variable world we had Y = S as the variable to be explained and explanatory
variable X = C. Now a new variable Z = F is added.
If  P[Y  |  X,  Z]  =  P[Y  |  X]  then  explanatory  variable  X  contains  all  information  and  is
sufficient  for  the conditional  probability  between Y and X.  Then Y and Z are said to be
“conditionally  independent”  given X, and  this  is  denoted  as  (Y ¦  Z |  X).  A shorter  and
clearer English expression is that Y and Z are “free from each other” relative to X.
RFreePr@Y, ZD@XD
ConditionalPr@ HY ¦  ZL D@ X D
Note that there is a difference between such a relation for some fixed constants like {X0,
X1} and  the  variables  X that  take  those  values.  For  the  relation  to  hold  for  variables  it
must hold for all their values.
It  would  be  useful  to  define  as  well  that  P[Y  ||  X]  =  "  Z  :  (Y  ¦  Z  |  X).  As  Hintikka
remarked,  a  quantifier  always  has  some  domain,  and  this  quantifier  runs  over  the
available  concepts  in  the  domain  of  discussion,  either  the  variables  or  their  values,  so
that  if  X  is  a  variable  then  Z  too.  The  double  bar  expresses  that  X  is  necessary  and
sufficient  for  Y  and  that  there  cannot  be  any  confounding  (for  all  variables  that  are
available in the domain of discussion). 
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Schield  (2003)  remarks:  “Students  often  think  of  numerical  associations  as
immutable—as  unconditional.  By  studying  Simpson’s  Paradox  students  overcome  this
mistaken perception.” Those students not only confuse P[X, Y] and P[Y | X] but thus also
P[Y | X] with P[Y || X]. Let us call this the “confusus libertatis”.
PM 1. This also causes the thought that advances in mathematical notation are made by
catching confusions by students.
PM 2. Conditional  independence is often presented as: “If P[X | Y, Z] = P[X | Z] then X
and  Y are  conditionally  independent  given Z,  and  this  is  denoted  as  (X ¦  Y |  Z).”  This
presentation derives from the alphabetical order X, Y, Z, and it derives from the didactics
of  teachers  in  statistics  who  want  to  have  their  alphabet  in  neat  order.  But,  in  proper
didactics,  the  focus  of  the  student  is  on  X and Y,  and  not  on  X and Z.  The  student  has
been  working  in  the  two-variable  world  and  suddenly  there  is  a  third.  The  normal
risk-averse  student  will  tend  to  regard  this  Z  as  less  relevant,  and  neglect  it,  like  an
austrich will hide its head in the sand or like children hide behind their hands or under a
blanket.  Only the minority of risk-prone students will  focus on this  new event Z and be
willing to accept that it suddenly is the more important variable in a new definition. We
better  serve the majority,  the risk-averse students.  We also had the convention that X is
the explanatory variable so that (S ¦ F | C) = (Y ¦ Z | X) anyway. We should not require
students to suddenly invert all variable relationships, just to get a neat alphabetical order.
Possibly it  are not the students but the teachers  who are a bit  confused, which could be
the “confusus doctoris”.
PM 3.  We  already  mentioned  the  layout  of  Kleinbaum  et  al.  (2003),  with  the  issue  of
confounding presented in chapter 10 and not in chapter 2. The current chapter 2 gives an
overview of epidemiology. But the title of the book and CD is “ActivEpi”. The overview
confronts  the  student  with  all  kinds  of  concepts  that  cannot  be  actively  applied  since
they are only half understood. The long list of new topics might be called technically an
“overview”  but  the  real  meaning  of  “overview”  is  to  create  insight.  This  would  be
another  case  of  “confusus  doctoris”.  It  would  be  much  better  to  actually  start  doing  a
case,  in “learning  by doing” and “hands  on studying”, where  both 2 × 2 and 2 × 2 × 2
tables  are  used,  such  that  the  2 ×  2 ×  2  table  helps  to  understand  what  the  2  ×  2 table
means.  Once  the  student  has  mastered  the  ETC  format  and  has  a  sense  of
accomplishment then one can proceed with calculating incidence rates, relating counts to
person years, to show that epidemiology is more complicated. PM. That book would also
benefit from printing in columns, given its pagewidth.
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PM 4.  It is  advisable  to use the phrase “relative  freedom” as equivalent  to “conditional
independence”.  The  latter  phrase  is  a  technical  term  from  the  realm  of  theorists  who
work with the concept on a daily basis. The normal student will be put off, however, and
hide under the blanket again. Independence is like freedom however and conditioning in
probability  theory  is  just  seeing  probabilities  in  their  relative  proportions.  The  term
“relative freedom” is more student-friendly.
PM 5. Students  confuse P[X | Y] and P[Y  | X] as well.  This is also understandable since
we  have  to  consider  both  directions  EXZ and  EZX before  we  can  decide  which  is  the
confounder (the “confusus directionis”).
Conditional independence or relative freedom - continued
We took r = P[S | C, ¬F] as the basic risk and b = P[S | ¬C, ¬F] as the background risk.
How is this  related  to independence ? When do the following equalities  hold, and what
would  it  mean  ?  Above  statistical  independence  was  not  enough  and  we  might  be
required to impose even stronger conditions.
r = P[S | C, ¬F] = ? = P[S | C] = R
b = P[S | ¬C, ¬F] = ? = P[S | ¬C] = B
It appears (see also the examples above) that we still have freedom to deviate from these
equalities,  even  under  independence.  So,  we  can  simple  impose  those  conditions,  as
separate assumptions of their own.
Hence:
  (i)  Iff (S ¦ ¬F | C) then R = r 
  (ii)  Iff (S ¦ ¬F | ¬C) then B = b 
  (iii)  Iff (S ¦ ¬F | Truth) then R = r, B = b, RF  = p r + (1 - p) b and then the 
seeming relative risk is
 
RFÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
BF
 = 
p r + H1-pL bÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
q r + H1-qL b
  (iv)  If (iii) is extended to marginal independence of Effect and Confounding then 
this causes that the seeming relative risk must be 1:
 RFÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
BF
 = 1
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  (v)  Marginal independence of Truth and Confounding (p = q  = c) of course is 
conceptually different from the notion of the relative freedom of S and ¬F from 
Truth. (Different variables are involved.)
PM: Imposing relative freedom also has these consequences:
For (i), we already had P[S, C, ¬F] = P[S | C, ¬F] P[C | ¬F] P[¬F] = r q (1 - f). If it holds
then R = r and since c = p f + q (1 - f):
P[S, C, F] + P[S, C, ¬F] = P[S, C] = R c = r c
P[S | C, F] = P[S, C, F] / (P[C | F] P[F]) = (R c - r q (1 - f)) / (p f) = r (c - q (1 - f))
/ (p f) = r
For (ii), we had P[S, ¬C, ¬F] = b (1 - q) (1 - f). If it holds then B = b then similary P[S |
¬C, F] = b.
Considering the case when R = r and  B = b
That  R  =  r  and  B =  b  is  actually  the  situation  studied  by  Schield  (2003),  “Simpson’s
paradox  and  Cornfield’s  conditions”.  In  a  nutshell,  when  translating  epidemiology  to
terms  and  concepts  that  a  simple  economist  like  this  author  can  understand,  we had  to
develop  the  full  apparatus  above,  to  arrive  at  this  special  case.  It  hasn’t  been  an  easy
path, and the realatively few pages for the reader above actually represent some years of
study  for  this  author.  These  apparantly  are  assumptions  that  epidemiologists  may
commonly make  and  that  they  might  mention  superficially  but  perhaps  not  too  clearly
for  the  cross-over  scientist.  The  translation  problem  hinges  on  the  point  that  in  the
“structural  equations modelling” world, that forms the habitat of this author, conditional
independences  of course  are used,  but  they are  not  discussed  like we have done above,
and the language and conventions of epidemiology didn’t allow the quick connection as
has been provided by the bridge above.
Relabel the parameters into the notation of Schield (2003):
{r1, r2} = {r, b} = {R, B}
{R1, R2} = {RF , BF}
{p1, p2} = {p, q}.
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Then we can find the seeming risks as Ri = {r1, r2}. {pi, 1 - pi}, or R1= p1r1 + (1 - p1) r2
and R2= p2  r1  + (1 - p2) r2. The seeming risk difference is R1  - R2ã (r1  - r2)(p1  - p2). If
that difference is zero then the seeming relative risk is 1 and then effect and confounding
are marginally independent.
A proportionality condition (since we assume constant rates) is that if r1> r2  (it is a real
cause,  otherwise  define  the  reverse)  and  p1  >  p2  (it  is  a  serious  confounder,  otherwise
define the reverse) then also (3) R1> R2 and, importantly, p1 / p2 ¥ R1/ R2 (equal when B
=  0).The  latter  inequality  may be  called  the  “Cornfield  condition”  (Schield  (2003)  and
Appendix B). It may also be seen as R - B ¥ RF  - BF .
This sets R = r and  B = b.
lis = RiskToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8r, b<D;
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD êê Simplify
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder Hc + H f - 1L qL r
Ÿ Confounder -H f - 1L q r
b H-c+ f - f q + qL
b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
Ÿ Success
Confounder -Hc+ H f - 1L qL Hr- 1L
Ÿ Confounder H f - 1L q Hr- 1L
Hb - 1L Hc+ f Hq - 1L - qL
-Hb - 1L H f - 1L Hq - 1L
Hres = ETCStatistics@lis, N Æ FalseD L êê MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success c r b - b c -c b + b + c r
Ÿ Success c - c r Hb - 1L Hc- 1L b Hc - 1L- c r+ 1
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success q r b - b q -q b + b + q r
Ÿ Success q - q r Hb - 1L Hq - 1L b Hq - 1L- q r+ 1
Sum q 1 - q 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder c+ H f - 1L q -c+ f - f q + q f
Ÿ Confounder q - f q H f - 1L Hq - 1L 1 - f
Sum c 1 - c 1
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
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Confounder Ÿ Confounder
Success b H-c+ f - f q + qL + Hc+ H f - 1L qL r H f - 1L Hb Hq - 1L - q rL
Ÿ Success -q r f + f + b Hc+ f Hq - 1L- qL + Hq - cL r -H f - 1L Hb Hq - 1L- q r+ 1L
Sum f 1 - f
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
N Ø 1
NSuccessØ -c b + b + c r
NCauseØ c
NConfounder Ø f
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø c-qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
 0
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø True
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ True
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ r
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ b
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ r
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ b
Risk Ø
i
k
jj r b
r b
y
{
zz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø r
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ b
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ c+H f -1L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ q
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ b H-c+ f - f q+qL+Hc+H f -1L qL rÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ -q b + b + q r
RRiskHTrueL Ø rÅÅÅÅ
b
RRiskHCauseLØ rÅÅÅÅ
b
RelativePrHConfounderLØ c+H f -1L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f q
RRiskHSeemingL Ø b H-c+ f- f q+qL+Hc+H f -1L qL rÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-q b+b+q rL
Conditions Ø 9r > b, r > b, c-qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
¥ 0, Hc-qL Hb-rLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
 0, b Hq-cLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f q Hb Hq-1L-q rL ¥ 0=
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - r
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - b
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 1 - r
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 1 - b
SafetyØ
i
k
jj 1 - r 1 - b
1 - r 1 - b
y
{
zz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jj 1 - r  0 1 - b  1
1 - r  0 1 - b  1
y
{
zz
ETCSimpsonØ 8NecessaryØ False, SufficientØ 8r > b, r > b, b > r<<
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
The difference now also is in the middle column.
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ETCRiskTable@resD êê Rationalize êê Simplify
Name Value Name Value Name Value
Cause r r R r Rf
b H-c+ f - f q+qL+Hc+H f -1L qL rÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
Background b b B b Bf -q b + b + q r
Difference r - b r- b R - B r- b Rf - Bf - Hc-qL Hb-rLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
Ratio r ê b rÅÅÅÅ
b
R ê B rÅÅÅÅ
b
Rf ê Bf b H-c+ f - f q+qL+Hc+H f -1L qL rÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f H-q b+b+q rL
Though the above does not quite show it, the seeming relative risk RF  / BF  simplifies. To
show this, we need to do the following. 
† Note that the output above does not have an simple p.
p ä ConditionalPr@"Cause"D@"Confounder"D ê. res
p 
c+ H f - 1L q
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
† But if we use it ... then we find the Cornfield et al. condition mentioned by 
Schield (2003).
RRisk@"Seeming"D ê. res ê. c Æ p f + q H1 - fL êê Simplify
- p b + b + p r
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
-q b + b + q r
And by consequence for RF :
ConditionalPr@"Success"D@ "Confounder"D ê. res ê. c Æ p f + q H1 - fL êê Simplify
- p b + b + p r
Technical  note:  If  p  were  introduced  in  the  input  then  the  input  would  be
overdetermined. An option might be to let n become the dependent outcome but then we
would not have a normalized situation (or have all kinds of checks and possibly arbitrary
internal solutions on it). The current input format seems optimal, with the small cost that
the seeming relative risk looks a bit differently than the ratio of weighted rates. It is a bit
unfortunate  that  current  mathematical  concepts  and  routines  are  awkward  at  handling
so-called  “overdetermined” situations  that  however  are  neat  human psychological  ways
to  handle  information.  (This  would  be  another  opportunity  to  devise  a  notation  to
capture this notion.)
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Variations on input
Consider  the  example  contingency  table  that  this  discussion  started  with.  Given  the
output  from the  statistical  analysis  we  can  easily  re-create  the  figures  in  the  table  with
our current method at parameterization. Let us consider some variations.
The average relative risk R / B for the disease is about 9. For the confounder we keep the
800 versus  200 split,  so  that  f  = 0.8.  Of the  confounding group some p = 51% of  their
numbers  contribute  to  the  risk population  and  the  non-confounders  contribute  q = 24%
of their numbers. The prevalence c of the disease then becomes:  
c ä 0.2 * .24 + 0.8 * .51
c  0.456
The ETCStatistics already created key output. We can substitute these in the right slots.
We put the routine in Hold, otherwise we would just  recover the same data (except that
1000.0 should be an integer and not a real).
RiskToETCArray@D ê. res1
Hold@RiskToETCArrayD@80.456, 0.145833, 0.0328947<, 80.8, 0.24<, 80.179825, 0.0202206<, 1000.D
We  already  observed  above  that  the  example  contingency  table  does  not  satisfy  the
assumptions of conditional independence since we find that r ∫ R and b ∫ B. What is an
interesting  variation  on  the  input  ?  Normally  we  would  take  the  r  and  b  since  these
would be the key parameters. But this is an exercise, and thus we may also take R and B
and see what happens.
† This is what happens when we take R and B, that have a seeming relative risk 
R / B = 9. Something goes horribly wrong.
lis = RiskToETCArray@8.456, .18, .02<, 8 0.8, .24<, 8 .18, 02<, 1000D;
ETCArrayCheck::neg :  Negative elements found R  B
ETCArrayCheck::rel :  Warning: p ê q  Rf ê Bf
ETCArrayCheck::neg :  Negative elements found 8-693<
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† And it does not help if we scale it down.
lis = RiskToETCArray@8.456, .09, .01<, 8 0.8, .24<, 8 .09, 01<, 1000D;
ETCArrayCheck::neg :  Negative elements found R  B
ETCArrayCheck::rel :  Warning: p ê q  Rf ê Bf
ETCArrayCheck::neg :  Negative elements found 8-150<
† So, let us just take the structural parameters (as we already planned to do).
lis = RiskToETCArray@8.456, .1458, .0329<, 8 0.8, .24<, 8 .1458, .0329<, 1000D;
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder 59
Ÿ Confounder 7
13
5
Ÿ Success
Confounder 349
Ÿ Confounder 41
379
147
The  current  table  is  based  upon  conditional  independence  while  the  original  example
wasn’t. It is hard to say what the differences amount to - especially since these are only
arbitrary numbers.
† These are the differences with respect to the example table. The results are no 
different when the confounder isn’t present. When it is present, we lose some 
successes, most when the cause is present, with some compensation when the 
cause is’t present. 
TableForm@lis - CT@DataD, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder -16
Ÿ Confounder 0
7
0
Ÿ Success
Confounder 16
Ÿ Confounder 0
-7
0
The summary statistics become:
† There is a small deviation from conditional independence since we rounded 
the contingency table. A useful point to note is that relative freedom is not 
sufficient to turn this case into one of “simple causality”. The “cause” that we 
have here is only a “contributing factor”.
HReport@VariantD = ETCStatistics@lis, N Æ TrueD êê NL êê MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
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Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success 66 18 84
Ÿ Success 390 526 916
Sum 456 544 1000
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success 0.035 0.025 0.06
Ÿ Success 0.205 0.735 0.94
Sum 0.24 0.76 1.
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder 408 392 800
Ÿ Confounder 48 152 200
Sum 456 544 1000
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
Confounder Ÿ Confounder Total
Success 72 12 84
Ÿ Success 728 188 916
Sum 800 200 1000
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ik
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
N Ø 1000.
NSuccessØ 84.
NCauseØ 456.
NConfounder Ø 800.
MarginalPrHSuccessL Ø 0.084
MarginalPrHCauseL Ø 0.456
MarginalPrHConfounderL Ø 0.8
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø False
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø False
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ False
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.145833
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.0328947
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.144608
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.0331633
Risk Ø
i
k
jj 0.144608 0.0331633
0.145833 0.0328947
y
{
zz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø 0.144737
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ 0.0330882
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ 0.51
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.24
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ 0.09
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.06
RRiskHTrueL Ø 4.43333
RRiskHCauseLØ 4.37427
RelativePrHConfounderLØ 2.125
RRiskHSeemingL Ø 1.5
Conditions Ø 8True, True, True, True, True<
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.854167
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.967105
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.855392
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.966837
SafetyØ
i
k
jj 0.855392 0.966837
0.854167 0.967105
y
{
zz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jj False False
False False
y
{
zz
ETCSimpsonØ 8NecessaryØ False, SufficientØ 8True, True, False<<
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
The main conclusion is that the average relative risk is no longer 9. NB. We should have
R / B = r / b but after constructing the data matrix we rounded the data again so there is a
small difference.
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ETCRiskTable@D
Name Value Name Value Name Value
Cause r 0.145833 R 0.144737 Rf 0.09
Background b 0.0328947 B 0.0330882 Bf 0.06
Difference r - b 0.112939 R - B 0.111649 Rf - Bf 0.03
Ratio r ê b 4.43333 R ê B 4.37427 Rf ê Bf 1.5
Thus,  imposing relative  freedom makes that  the  average relative  risk  becomes equal  to
the  true  relative  risk,  R /  B =  r /  b.  Either  (1)  we get negative values (if  we impose an
average relative risk of 9) or (2) we accept the true relative risk but then see the average
relative risk adjusted.
OutsideTable@Report, 8Example, Variant<,
8RRisk@"True"D, RRisk@"Cause"D, RelativePr@"Confounder"D, RRisk@"Seeming"D<D
Example Variant
RRiskHTrueL 4.43333 4.43333
RRiskHCauseL 8.89314 4.37427
RelativePrHConfounderL 2.125 2.125
RRiskHSeemingL 1.6875 1.5
Variation  would rather  be done on the true parameters and not  on the averages that are
found. To take the averages or their ratio’s as the true parameters for this 2 × 2 × 2 table
might be called the “confusus additionis” (a special case of “confusus magnitudinis”).
Switching between truth and confounding
We mentioned the issue of choosing EXZ or EZX. We may read “cause” as “confounder”
and conversely, and repeat the analysis. One hopes that this does not confound the reader.
† This still uses the labels as above. It puts the confounder in the middle of the 
table so that a call of the ETCStatistics routine will take it as the cause.
CT@Order, 8"Effect", "Confounding", "Truth"<D
Confounder Ÿ Confounder
Success
Cause 75
Ÿ Cause 6
7
5
Ÿ Success
Cause 333
Ÿ Cause 386
41
147
If we take the statistics  of this case it will appear that r < b or R < B. This makes for a
dumb  causal  model  and  silly  confounding.  Hence,  we  reverse  the  categories  as  well.
When good weather has a lower risk than bad weather, then the latter should be the true
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cause. We can try various reversals for various variables untill  we have a serious causal
model.
† This is from above model.
HReport@ConfoundD = ETCStatistics@%, N Æ True, Print Æ FalseD êê NL êê
MatrixForm;
"Conditions" ê. Report@ConfoundD
8False, True, True, True, False<
† This reverses the old confounder and new cause categories. Still some 
conditions not satisfied.
CT@Switch, "NewModel-1", "ETC-1-Truth-1-Confounding-1-Effect",
"Confounding" Æ 8! "Confounder", "Confounder"<D;
HReport@ConfoundD = ETCStatistics@CT@"NewModel-1", DataD,
N Æ True, Print Æ FalseD êê NL êê MatrixForm;
"Conditions" ê. Report@ConfoundD
8True, False, False, True, False<
† This reverses also the supposed confounder categories. Still some conditions 
not satisfied.
CT@Switch, "NewModel-2",
"ETC-1-Truth-1-Confounding-1-Effect", "Truth" Æ 8! "Cause", "Cause"<,
"Confounding" Æ 8! "Confounder", "Confounder"<D;
HReport@ConfoundD = ETCStatistics@CT@"NewModel-2", DataD,
N Æ True, Print Æ FalseD êê NL êê MatrixForm;
"Conditions" ê. Report@ConfoundD
8False, False, True, False, True<
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† This reverses the categories for all variables, also the effect. Ah, finally all 
conditions are satisfied.
CT@Switch, "NewModel-3", "ETC-1-Truth-1-Confounding-1-Effect",
"Effect" Æ 8! "Success", "Success"<, "Truth" Æ 8! "Cause", "Cause"<,
"Confounding" Æ 8! "Confounder", "Confounder"<D
Ÿ Confounder Confounder
Ÿ Success
Ÿ Cause 147
Cause 41
386
333
Success
Ÿ Cause 5
Cause 7
6
75
HReport@ConfoundD = ETCStatistics@CT@"NewModel-3", DataD,
N Æ True, Print Æ FalseD êê NL êê MatrixForm;
"Conditions" ê. Report@ConfoundD
8True, True, True, True, True<
We have found a new model that on the face of it might be a causal model while we also
might  be  properly  confounded.  Above  table  still  contains  the  original  labels.  We  now
relabel. Above suppressed the output but we can show it now.
With  these  relabelled  data,  the  analysis  would  be  that  the  “the  absence  of  the  original
confounder” would cause the non-success. An example helps. If the original model EXZ
for  example  would  be  that  smoking caused  lung  cancer,  with  a  confounding  difference
between  cities  (bad  air)  and  rural  areas  (good  air),  then  the  new  causal  analysis  EZX
would be that the rural areas with their good air “caused” the absence of lung cancer. We
are  not  speaking about  statistical  association  but  about  cause  here.  Let  us  first  produce
the statistics and then think about the causal chain (as people normally tend to do).
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† Now everything is relabeled. What was Truth now is Confouding, what was 
¬F now is C, and so on.
ETCSquare@"NewModel-3"D;
147
41
386
333
5
7
6
75
SCF
SCf
ScF
Scf
sCF
sCf
scF
scf
† This also uses the new labels.
HReport@ConfoundD = ETCStatistics@CT@"NewModel-3", DataD, N Æ TrueD êê NL êê
MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success 188 719 907
Ÿ Success 12 81 93
Sum 200 800 1000
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success 0.0899123 0.730263 0.820175
Ÿ Success 0.0153509 0.164474 0.179825
Sum 0.105263 0.894737 1.
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder 152 392 544
Ÿ Confounder 48 408 456
Sum 200 800 1000
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
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Confounder Ÿ Confounder Total
Success 533 374 907
Ÿ Success 11 82 93
Sum 544 456 1000
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
N Ø 1000.
NSuccessØ 907.
NCauseØ 200.
NConfounder Ø 544.
MarginalPrHSuccessL Ø 0.907
MarginalPrHCauseL Ø 0.2
MarginalPrHConfounderL Ø 0.544
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø False
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø False
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ False
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.854167
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.816176
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.967105
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.984694
Risk Ø
i
k
jj 0.967105 0.984694
0.854167 0.816176
y
{
zz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø 0.94
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ 0.89875
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ 0.279412
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.105263
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ 0.979779
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.820175
RRiskHTrueL Ø 1.04655
RRiskHCauseLØ 1.0459
RelativePrHConfounderLØ 2.65441
RRiskHSeemingL Ø 1.1946
Conditions Ø 8True, True, True, True, True<
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.145833
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.183824
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.0328947
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.0153061
SafetyØ
i
k
jj 0.0328947 0.0153061
0.145833 0.183824
y
{
zz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jj False False
False False
y
{
zz
ETCSimpsonØ 8NecessaryØ False, SufficientØ 8False, True, True<<
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
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ETCRiskTable@D
Name Value Name Value Name Value
Cause r 0.854167 R 0.94 Rf 0.979779
Background b 0.816176 B 0.89875 Bf 0.820175
Difference r - b 0.0379902 R - B 0.04125 Rf - Bf 0.159604
Ratio r ê b 1.04655 R ê B 1.0459 Rf ê Bf 1.1946
This reproduces the output of the original example EXZ and the new EZX.
OutsideTable@Report, 8Example, Confound<, 8RRisk@"True"D, RRisk@"Cause"D,
RelativePr@"Confounder"D, RRisk@"Seeming"D, "Conditions"<D
Example Confound
RRiskHTrueL 4.43333 1.04655
RRiskHCauseL 8.89314 1.0459
RelativePrHConfounderL 2.125 2.65441
RRiskHSeemingL 1.6875 1.1946
Conditions
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
The  numerical  conditions  for  calling  this  a  proper  causal  model  are  satisfied.  Yet,  in
terms of content is may not quite convince. Of course, it all depends on what the content
is. As in the stated example of lung cancer and rural areas, it is difficult  to imagine how
people  would  have  a  natural  disposition  to  cancer  and  that  “good  rural  air”  would
prevent  or  cure  it.  It  might  be  some  curative  pollen  or  so.  In  terms  of  causality,  it  is
turning the world upside down in changing the causality that smoking and bad air cause
lung  cancer  into  that  rural  good  air  causes  health  (with  non-smoking as  a  confouder).
But,  of course, these are entirely  fictional  data and we don’t have a real  problem so we
cannot  say  anything  yet.  The  only  conclusion  that  we  arrive  at  is  that  these  conditions
and  manipulations  definitely  can  help  and  guide  us  towards  better  understanding  the
causal relations.  For a definite  answer on causality we still  depend upon the true model
of the world.
Safety  and  the  conditions  on  safety  are  worth  mentioning  too.  The  differences  from 0
(left column) and 1 (right column) make that we do not have a simple cause in this EZX
configuration.  The “wunderbar”  result  of the original  has  been greatly resolved since w
is much closer to 0 now. But it comes at the price of a v that was close to 1 as it should
be  and  now  is  closer  to  0  as  it  shouldn’t  be.  The  lack  of  evidence  for  a  EZX  would
support the EXZ interpretation.
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Some readers might expect that I now reveal that the true relation was EZX to start with.
Sorry, these are entirely fictional data.
Comparing the Simpson paradox and the Cornfield et al. condition
The  Cornfield  et  al.  condition  arises  from  assuming  relative  freedom  or  conditional
independence of S and F given C. Thus, a variable is defined to be a “confounder” if and
only  if  it  cannot  contribute  information  on  the  causal  relation  from  C  to  S.  This  is  a
rather  strong  condition  since  it  limits  the  degree  to  which  we can be  confounded.  This
could be called the “confusus confusi”. However, when the condition is satisfied, which
we  can  do  by  directly  checking  conditional  independence  or  using  the  inequality
condition derived by Cornfield et al. (easiest R - B ≥ RF  - BF), then we may indeed have
more confidence in the notion that F is only a confounder. However, we would still need
a  model  to  explain  the  causal  relations,  since  we  cannot  exclude  mere  chance  as  the
reason that the condition is satisfied.
The Simpson paradox as discussed in Appendix A is a bit different.  The main thrust of
the  paradox  comes  from  subpopulations  such  that  those  show  property  A  while  the
summed total shows property ¬A. The particularly relevant property is relative risk, such
that  the subpopulations  have RR > 1 while RR < 1 for  the summed total.  The only two
serious subpopulations that we have in the ETC world comes from the division in F and
¬F.  If  we  were  to  divide  along the  lines  of  Effect  and  Truth  then  this  would  not  make
sense  since  it  is  precisely  their  relationship  that  is  the  causal  one.  What  happens  with
their  properties  and  proportions  is  not  relevant  and  thus  cannot  be  paradoxical.  Taking
the division along the line of Confounding makes sense in that the distribution of f and 1
- f  is  taken as  a more or less  “causal”  explanation  for  the overall  effect.  Thus,  the only
relevant  Simpson  paradox  for  the  ETC  world  is  that  the  subpopulations  of  F  and  ¬F
have  relative  risks  pointing  one  way  while  the  total  points  another  way.  The  final
question is what directions to take. For the ¬F population we have already assumed that
r  >  b,  so  that  RR  >  1.  It  would  be  strange  for  the  F  population  to  have  a  different
direction, and thus we have RR > 1 there too. Hence, the paradox would be that the total
would show RR < 1. That  would be a paradox indeed, since under our assumptions the
confounder  really  cannot  affect  the  true  causal  relations  so  that  it  would  be  surprising
indeed  if  it  were  to  affect  the  relative  risk  measure.  In  Appendix  A  we  derive  the
necessary conditions for the paradox as b < r < 1 - v < 1 - w, which translates too as w <
v < 1 - r, and the sufficient  condition that when these are satisfied  and then R < B, then
the Simpson paradox occurs. In the discussion above on safety we determined the ranges
of  the  parameters.  For  a  causal  process  to  get  closer  to  the  simple  causal  model  we
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would require that w Ø 0, v Ø 1 and r Ø 1. The causal model requires that v Ø 1 while
the Simpson paradox requires that v Ø 0. Under normal causal assumptions that v > 1 - r
the  Simpson  paradox  could  not  exist.  The  Simpson  paradox  requires  that  the  “other
causes” would have perverse effects. The outcome R < B makes less sense when we are
speaking about  a  true cause and a true confounder.  Hence, in the 2 × 2 × 2 ETC world
the Simpson paradox has no good reason to exist, and if the conditions are satisfied then
one should check one’s causal model. What is conceivable, however, is a relative effect,
in that the subpopulations have say RR > 3 and the sum 1 < RR < 3. This has not been
looked into.
Under relative  freedom or conditional  independence {R, B} = {r, b} and with r >  b we
find that the Simpson paradox cannot occur. Thus the Cornfield condition is sufficient to
prevent  Simpson.  Yet  this  limits  the  range  of  possible  models.  It  is  more  adequate  to
allow for the possibility of (some, statistical) dependence. It makes more sense to require
that v > 1 - r and this indeed also prevents the paradox. 
We might call it the “confusus conditionis (Simpson et Cornfield et al.)” to not see these
conditions in their proper relation.
If some crucial data are missing
Up to now we have been assuming that we have a completely filled contingency table. It
may also be that the crucial second line is missing so that we cannot calculate our r and
b.  As  said,  experimental  economics  may  meet  with  practical  or  moral  limitations.  For
example, if we do an experiment on the impact of drinking water or drinking beer on the
quality  of  decisions  by Central  Bankers,  all  other  drinks excluded,  then it  might not  be
considered appropriate to withhold them those two drinks as well for the weeks that the
experiment would take. 
lis = CT@DataD ê. 8 5 Æ Missing@1D , 147 Æ Missing@2D<;
TableForm@lis , TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder 75
Ÿ Confounder 7
6
MissingH1L
Ÿ Success
Confounder 333
Ÿ Confounder 41
386
MissingH2L
There  are  all  kinds  of  variations  on  this  theme.  For  example,  the  data  on  success  may
come from one country  and  the  data  from failure  may come from another  country,  and
one has to patch together a joint  story. Or, indeed, we would leave the 2 × 2 × 2 world
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and meet more variables and sizes. All this is just to say that the ETC model looks strong
but that this may be deceptive since it assumes full knowledge.
We  cannot  review  all  possible  combinations  on  missing  data  but  now  that  we  have
mentioned  above  example  it  is  tempting  to  consider  it.  Let  us  compare  the  data  table
with the fully parameterized table. However, the most crucial  missing datum is the total
sample size n. For a controlled experiment one might set the total number of cases where
both  cause and confounder  are  withheld,  so the  m = Missing[1]  + Missing[2]  is  known
but  not  how  it  is  distributed  over  success  or  failure.  In  that  case,  also,  m  is  set  by  the
experimenter  to an arbitrary number, and then not actually performed, which has a ring
of magic to it, since we may choose any number and then not do it. When the experiment
however runs over a limited number of weeks then one can indeed imagine that m has a
proper  value.  Let  us  assume this,  and  replace  Missing[2]  such  that  the  total  number  is
1000 again.
lis2 = SafetyToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D 1000; s
TableForm@lis2 , TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder 1000 Hc- H1 - f L qL H1 -wL
Ÿ Confounder 1000 H1 - f L q r
1000 H-c+ f H1 - qL+ qL H1 - vL
1000 b H1 - f L H1 - qL
Ÿ Success
Confounder 1000 Hc- H1 - f L qLw
Ÿ Confounder 1000 H1 - f L q H1 - rL
1000 H-c+ f H1 - qL+ qL v
1000 H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
sol = Solve@Add@lisD ä 1000, Missing@2DD;
lis = CT@DataD ê. 8 5 Æ Missing@1D , 147 Æ Missing@2D< ê. sol@@1DD;
TableForm@lis , TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder 75
Ÿ Confounder 7
6
MissingH1L
Ÿ Success
Confounder 333
Ÿ Confounder 41
386
152 -MissingH1L
It appears that other key parameters are not affected and that mainly our estimate of b is
impossible. The data still allow the calculation of c, f and q, still unaffected at 0.456, 0.8
and 0.24, so that the Missing[1] value is direct in proportion to b, as Missing[1] = 1000 b
* 0.2 * 0.76. Thus, in the statistics also those ratios are affected that depend upon b. 
Hres = HETCStatistics@lisD êê NL ê. H1. Æ 1LL êê MatrixForm
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause"D
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Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success 82 MissingH1L+ 6 MissingH1L+ 88
Ÿ Success 374 538 -MissingH1L 912 -MissingH1L
Sum 456 544 1000
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Cause, True, Ratio"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success 0.035 0.005 MissingH1.L 0.005 HMissingH1.L+ 7.L
Ÿ Success 0.205 0.005 H152. - 1. MissingH1.LL 0.005 H193. - 1. MissingH1.LL
Sum 0.24 0.76 1.
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder 408 392 800
Ÿ Confounder 48 152 200
Sum 456 544 1000
Matrix ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D
Confounder Ÿ Confounder Total
Success 81 MissingH1L + 7 MissingH1L+ 88
Ÿ Success 719 193 -MissingH1L 912 -MissingH1L
Sum 800 200 1000
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jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
N Ø 1000.
NSuccessØ MissingH1L+ 88.
NCauseØ 456.
NConfounder Ø 800.
MarginalPrHSuccessL Ø 0.001 HMissingH1L + 88.L
MarginalPrHCauseL Ø 0.456
MarginalPrHConfounderL Ø 0.8
IndependentPrHTruth, ConfoundingL Ø False
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ CauseD Ø False
ConditionalPr@ HSuccess ¦  Ÿ ConfounderL D@ Ÿ CauseDØ 49. MissingH1L  114.
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.145833
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.00657895 MissingH1L
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.183824
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.0153061
Risk Ø
i
k
jj 0.183824 0.0153061
0.145833 0.00657895 MissingH1L
y
{
zz
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ CauseD Ø 0.179825
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ CauseDØ 0.00183824 HMissingH1L+ 6.L
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ ConfounderDØ 0.51
ConditionalPr@ Cause D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.24
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ ConfounderDØ 0.10125
ConditionalPr@ Success D@ Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.005 HMissingH1L+ 7.L
RRiskHTrueL Ø 22.1667ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
MissingH1L
RRiskHCauseLØ 97.8246ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
MissingH1L+6.
RelativePrHConfounderLØ 2.125
RRiskHSeemingL Ø 20.25ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
MissingH1L+7.
Conditions Ø 96. MissingH1L  133., 57. MissingH1L  5234., True, 4. MissingH1L  53., 20.25ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
MissingH1L+7.
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 0.854167
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, Ÿ ConfounderDØ 1 - 0.00657895 MissingH1L
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.816176
ConditionalPr@ Ÿ Success D@ Ÿ Cause, ConfounderDØ 0.984694
SafetyØ
i
k
jj 0.816176 0.984694
0.854167 1 - 0.00657895 MissingH1L
y
{
zz
SimpleCauseQØ
i
k
jj False False
False 1 - 0.00657895 MissingH1L  1
y
{
zz
ETCSimpsonØ 8NecessaryØ False, SufficientØ 8True, 6. MissingH1L  133., MissingH1L  -76671.3
We just considered one consequence of missing data. The general idea is that when data
are  missing  then  this  reduces  the  scope  for  conclusions.  Perhaps  there  are  more
possibilities  for conjectures like “if the process would be conditionally independent then
...”, but when such conjectures are not testable due to the lack of data anyhow, then there
seems little value in them. 
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The collected confusions
We identified:
  1.  “confusus definitionis”: mixing up the ETC analysis with other kinds of 
problems in 2 × 2 × 2 tables.
  2.  “confusus directionis”: not knowing to take either EXZ or EZX.
  3.  “confusus nomenclaturis”: confusing variables and values.
  4.  “confusus categoriae”: taking the wrong value of the right category as the true 
cause.
  5.  “confusus magnitudinis”: being unsure about the size of the effect (for various 
reasons).
  6.  “confusus additionis”, a special case of 5: using averages instead of the true 
parameters.
  7.  “confusus contributionis”: confused about assigning the label “cause” to f  
(which is OK if you are aware of it).
  8.  “confusus causalitatis”, confusing an issue of mere association with an analysis 
of causality, with different interpretations of the Simpson paradox. (This 
confusion is a specific kind of 1 and adds flavour to 2 to 7.) (This is not “post 
hoc ergo propter hoc” since there is no time element yet.)
  9.  “confusus libertatis”: confusing P[X, Y] with P[Y | X] or P[Y | X] with P[Y || X] 
or both.
  10.  “confusus focis ad risces”: focussing on risk and forgetting about safety (and 
key parameters there).
  11.  “confusus historiae”: using a wrong historical example in trying to clarify a 
point but thereby actually increasing confusion (see Appendix B).
  12.  “confusus doctoris”: getting things wrong because you don’t think for yourself 
but follow your teachers who are confused on some issues and who e.g. focus 
on neat alphabetical order instead of what they told before.
  13.  “confusus confusi”: defining that something can only be a “confounder” if it 
satisfies relative freedom or conditional independence with the effect measure 
given the cause (the Cornfield et al. condition). This neglects confounders that 
show mere statistical association.
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  14.  “confusus conditionis (Simpson et Cornfield et al.)”: imposing the Cornfield et 
al. condition to prevent the Simpson paradox, while a weaker condition is 
sufficient (v > 1 - r). This can also be a special case of the “confusus focis ad 
risces”, since one focusses on a few risk averages while one should use the 
whole ETC table.
It would seem that this taxonomy merely restates what is already very well known to the
practical  epidemiologists.  Yet,  some  categorization  or  labelling  seems  to  help
understanding  the  issues.  As  a  cross-over  /  hitch-hiker  in  this  2  ×  2  ×  2  universe,  this
author  has  suffered  all  these  confusions  himself  at  one moment or another.  You should
not  feel  ashamed if  some happen  to  you.  (But  you  should  feel  ashamed right  from the
start when just follow the analysis in this paper without thinking for yourself.) 
Clarity about  these angles to confounding would seem to be a prerequisite  for  handling
the more formal approaches of Pearl (1998) or Pearl (2000) chapter 6 to confounding. 
PM. On the lighter side there is also the confusion that one doesn’t quite know what one
is  confused about, and on the darker side there is the awkward situation  that one thinks
that one isn’t confused while one is (with the added possibilities  that one’s environment
knows or doesn’t know, and everybody else knows or doesn’t know).
Conclusions
  1-7.  See the earlier intermediate conclusions.
  8.  Causality cannot be resolved with statistical conditions just by themselves. The 
researcher still needs a model of the world that provides a guide on the direction 
from cause to effect. 
  9.  But with such a model of the world, the conditions and manipulations discussed 
here can be used to say more about causality and the effect size.
  10.  The ETC model is most powerful when we consider a “simple cause” since 
then we can impose strong conditions on the parameters of the matrix. A 
scientific discussion on cause and effect gains in clarity if causal chains can be 
broken down to those. (Yet models will always refer to “other causes” since it 
could well be impossible to exclude everything else.)
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Appendix A: The Simpson paradox
Introduction
The  Simpson  paradox  arises  when  at  least  two  subpopulations  show  property  A  while
adding  them gives property  ¬A.  Examples  and  discussions  are  in  Schield  (2003),  Saari
(2001) in voting theory, and Kleinbaum et al. (2003). 
Schield  (2003)  discusses  the  Simpson  paradox  and  suggests  that  the  Cornfield  et  al.
condition helps to understand it. However, it seems that these are two different issues, at
least in the ETC 2 × 2 × 2 world. The Cornfield et al. condition, e.g. p / q ≥ RF  / BF  or R
- B ≥  RF  - BF ,  concerns  the  border  sum matrices  while  the  Simpson paradox concerns
the addition of subpopulations. 
Saari  (2001)  contains  a  discussion  that  is  targetted  specifically  at  the  Simpson paradox
without  mentioning  the  Cornfield  et  al.  condition.  In  Saari’s  case,  the  paradox  arises
merely  from  the  weights  of  two  subpopulations.  Translated  to  our  ETC  world,  the
populations  F  and  ¬F  have  weights  f   and  1  -  f,  and  the  relative  risks  of  both
subpopulations would point into one direction while the sum would point into the other
direction.  This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  this  would  be  a  problem  for  causality,
with  its  true  parameters  {r,  b,  w,  v},  or  even  that  it  would  be  possible  given  our
assumptions.
Creating Simpson paradoxes
The following is a routine to create such a paradox e.g. for treatment-control matrices.
A treatment-control  matrix has  effect  rate  p1  under treatment  and effect  rate  p2  for  the
controls.
TreatmentControlMatrix@Set, Pr, n1, p1, n2, p2D ;
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TreatmentControlMatrix@TableD
Effective Ineffective Total
Treatment n1 p1 n1 - n1 p1 n1
Controls n2 p2 n2 - n2 p2 n2
Sum n1 p1 + n2 p2 -p1 n1 + n1 + n2 - n2 p2 n1 + n2
† This is the routine to create a paradox.
?SimpsonParadox
SimpsonParadox@8F1, p1, F2, p2<, 8S1, q1, S2, q2<D creates the First and Second Htreatment-
controlL matrices and conditions for the SimpsonParadox, such that the relative
risks Hor cure ratesL are p1êp2 > 1 and q1êq2 > 1 in the subpopulations, while that
is precisely the opposite for the total when the data are added. See InequalitySolve
when there are numerical values. The joint condition concerns linear combinations
of 8p1, q1< resp. 8p2, q2<, and necessary for the paradox is p2  p1  q2  q1. NB.
The sufficient condition is True if the paradox occurs Hbut only in the > direction
† This is the structure of the problem, with First and Second matrices, and rows 
1 and 2.
SimpsonParadox@8n1, p1, n2, p2<, 8m1, q1, m2, q2<D
:MatrixH1LØ
i
k
jjjjjjjj
n1 p1 n1 - n1 p1 n1
n2 p2 n2 - n2 p2 n2
n1 p1 + n2 p2 -p1 n1 + n1 + n2 - n2 p2 n1 + n2
y
{
zzzzzzzz,
MatrixH2LØ
i
k
jjjjjjjj
m1q1 m1-m1q1 m1
m2q2 m2-m2q2 m2
m1q1 +m2q2 -q1 m1+m1+m2-m2 q2 m1+m2
y
{
zzzzzzzz, MatrixHSumL Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
n1 p1 +
n2 p2 +
n1 p1 +
Condition Ø 8p1 > p2, q1 > q2, Hm2+ n2L Hn1 p1 +m1q1L  Hm1+ n1L Hn2 p2 +m2q2L<>
† This is an example where the first two relative risks (or cure rates) are larger 
than 1 while the sum shows a value lower than 1.
SimpsonParadox@888, 1 ê4, 10, 1 ê5<, 845, 5 ê9, 90, 4 ê9<D
:MatrixH1LØ
i
k
jjjjjjjj
22 66 88
2 8 10
24 74 98
y
{
zzzzzzzz, MatrixH2L Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
25 20 45
40 50 90
65 70 135
y
{
zzzzzzzz,
MatrixHSumLØ
i
k
jjjjjjjj
47 86 133
42 58 100
89 144 233
y
{
zzzzzzzz, Condition Ø 8True, True, True<>
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† This is an example where the three relative risks all point into the same 
direction.
SimpsonParadox@888, 1 ê4, 10, 1 ê5<, 845, 8 ê9, 90, 1 ê3<D
:MatrixH1LØ
i
k
jjjjjjjj
22 66 88
2 8 10
24 74 98
y
{
zzzzzzzz, MatrixH2L Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
40 5 45
30 60 90
70 65 135
y
{
zzzzzzzz,
MatrixHSumLØ
i
k
jjjjjjjj
62 71 133
32 68 100
94 139 233
y
{
zzzzzzzz, Condition Ø 8True, True, False<>
Relating the Simpson paradox to the ETC world
Let us consider a proper ETC contingency matrix and extract the submatrices for F and
¬F. Since  we can always  express  R and B in  terms of  w  and v, it  suffices  if  we do the
discussion  in  terms of  those output  parameters,  which helps  to link up our result  to the
Cornfield et al. condition.
lis = RiskToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8R, B<D êê Simplify;
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder H f - 1L q r+ c R
Ÿ Confounder -H f - 1L q r
-c B+ B+ b H-q f + f
b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
Ÿ Success
Confounder -R c+ c + q H-r f + f + r- 1L
Ÿ Confounder H f - 1L q Hr- 1L
B Hc - 1L- c+ f + b H f - 1L Hq
-Hb - 1L H f - 1L Hq - 1L
Extraction for F.
PopF = TransposeToFirst@lis, 83<D@@1DD;
TableForm@PopF,
TableHeadings Æ 8CT@TableHeadingsD@@1DD, CT@TableHeadingsD@@2DD<D
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success H f - 1L q r+ c R -c B+ B+ b H-q f + f + q - 1L
Ÿ Success -R c+ c + q H-r f + f + r- 1L B Hc- 1L - c+ f + b H f - 1L Hq - 1L - f q + q
Extraction for ¬F.
PopNotF = TransposeToFirst@lis, 83<D@@2DD;
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TableForm@PopNotF,
TableHeadings Æ 8CT@TableHeadingsD@@1DD, CT@TableHeadingsD@@2DD<D
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success -H f - 1L q r b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
Ÿ Success H f - 1L q Hr- 1L -Hb - 1L H f - 1L Hq - 1L
The sum
Pop = PopF + PopNotF êê Simplify;
TableForm@Pop,
TableHeadings Æ 8CT@TableHeadingsD@@1DD, CT@TableHeadingsD@@2DD<D
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success c R B- B c
Ÿ Success c- c R HB - 1L Hc - 1L
Define a general ETCRiskCondition. Since the condition of relative risk > 1 runs the risk
of  division  by  zero  but  is  the  same  as  the  risk  difference  >  0,  this  allows  us  some
freedom.
ETCRiskCondition@88a_, b_<, 8c_, d_<<D := ETCRiskCondition@ a ê Ha+ cL , b ê Hb+ dLD
ETCRiskCondition@88a, b<, 8c, d<< D
ETCRiskConditionJ aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a + c
,
b
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
b + d
N
Risks for F.
RiskPopF = ETCRiskCondition@PopFD êê Simplify
ETCRiskConditionJ H f - 1L q r+ c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ H f - 1L q ,
B Hc - 1L+ b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c + f Hq - 1L- q N
Risks for ¬F.
RiskPopNotF = ETCRiskCondition@PopNotF D êê Simplify
ETCRiskConditionHr, bL
The sum
RiskPop = ETCRiskCondition@PopD êê Simplify
ETCRiskConditionHR, BL
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Hence for the Simpson paradox:
8RiskPopF, RiskPopNotF, RiskPop <
:ETCRiskConditionJ H f - 1L q r+ c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ H f - 1L q ,
B Hc- 1L+ b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ f Hq - 1L- q N,
ETCRiskConditionHr, bL, ETCRiskConditionHR, BL>
A necessary condition for the Simpson paradox in the ETC world is p2 < p1 < q2 < q1,
which translates as:
RiskPopNotF@@2DD < RiskPopNotF@@1DD < RiskPopF@@2DD < RiskPopF@@1DD
b  r 
B Hc - 1L+ b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c + f Hq - 1L- q 
H f - 1L q r+ c R
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ H f - 1L q
In case we want a formulation of the latter in terms of the safety parameters:
% ê. Thread@8R, B< Æ ETCAverageRisksFromSafety@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<DD êê
Simplify
b  r  1 - v  1 -w
A sufficient  condition for  the Simpson paradox in the ETC world is (all  would be True
for the paradox to occur):
8RiskPopF ê. ETCRiskCondition@x_, y_D ¶ Hx > yL,
RiskPopNotF ê. ETCRiskCondition@x_, y_D ¶ Hx > yL,
RiskPop ê. ETCRiskCondition@x_, y_D ¶ Hx < yL<
: H f - 1L q r+ c RÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c + H f - 1L q >
B Hc- 1L+ b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c+ f Hq - 1L- q , r > b, R  B>
In case we want a formulation of the latter in terms of the safety parameters:
% ê. Thread@8R, B< Æ ETCAverageRisksFromSafety@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<DD êê
Simplify
:v > w, r > b, b H-q f + f + q - 1L - Hc+ f Hq - 1L- qL Hv- 1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c- 1
+w +
H f - 1L q Hr+w- 1L
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
> 1>
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Conclusion
Two conditions that are identified are: (1) v > w, (2) R < B. Both are not likely to occur
given the assumptions that we have formulated for a serious causal model. If we would
formulate the paradox in a reverse direction, then we would have to assume r < b, which
neither makes sense for a causal model. See further the body of the text for the summary
conclusion.
Appendix B: Fisher on smoking and confounding
Statement
The author is an independent researcher and has no material, political  or moral interests
in any issue on smoking and lung cancer.
Introduction
The  following  example  and  discussion  is  based  upon  Schield  (2003),  “Simpson’s
paradox and Cornfield’s conditions”. Shield presents a historical case of a discussion on
the  possible  causes  of  lung  cancer,  with  two  “Letters  to  the  editor”  by Sir  R.A.  Fisher
(1958ab).   Historical  examples often help clarifying an issue indeed. Yet, in this case it
appeared,  at  least  to  this  author,  after  some  struggle  for  clarity,  that  the  use  of  this
historical  example  actually  contributed  to  confusion.  That  is,  it  would  contribute  if  we
were to use it in the main body of the text. There was a version of this paper that actually
proceeded in this manner. But it totally confused both the history and the subject. Thus,
here in the appendix, the historical issue can find a good place for proper sub-discussion,
and  then  it  will  be  clarifying  again.  Schield  apparently  followed  the  history  as  it
afterwards  got to be told yet the objective  of his  paper is  different  from our objectives.
For us, it appears that the history needs to be rewritten. So, this is a new subject. History
on Fisher and smoking needs to be rewritten.
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An example problem setting
In 1958 it  was for the first  time seriously conjectured that smoking caused lung cancer.
Fisher  apparently  had  his  doubts,  though.  Fisher  (1958ab)  considered  fraternal  and
identical  twins  and  compared  their  habits  of  smoking,  that  he  categorized  into  being
either  alike  or  unlike.  He  found  that  51%  of  male  fraternal  twins  and  24%  of  male
identical twins had distinct different habits in smoking (smoking versus non-smoking, or
cigarette  versus  pipe).  This  indicated  a  strong  effect  of  genetics  and  thus  created  the
possibility,  also  in  this  debate  on  the  cause  for  lung  cancer,  that  smoking  was  just  a
confounder.  Genotype  might  very  well  cause  both  lung  cancer  and  a  disposition  to
smoke.  Fisher’s  data  on  smoking  habits  were  the  following  (correcting  a  typesetting
error):
CT@Set, "Fisher Twins"D
Fraternal Identical
Alike
Male 15
Female 9
39
44
Unlike
Male 16
Female 9
12
9
Fisher  (1958a):  “(...)  of  the  (male)  dizygotic  pairs  (...)  16  out  of  the  31  are  distinctly
different, this being 51 per cent. as against 24 per cent. (...) among the monozygotic. the
(male)  monozygotic  twins  show  closer  similarity  and  fewer  divergences  than  the
dizygotic. There  can therefore  be little  doubt that  the genotype exercises  a considerable
influence on the smoking and on the particular habit of smoking adopted (...)”. 
Note  that  the  discussion  quickly  becomes  complicated.  These  data  don’t  tell  anything
about  getting  cancer  or  the  amount  of  smoking.  They  just  show equality  of  habit.  The
“alike”  groups would be split  over smoking or not.  So there  is only a suggestion of the
influence  of  the  genotype.  Fisher  definitely  does  not  say  anything  particular  about  the
prevalences  of  hidden genetic  factors  that  would  be a  common cause  for  both  smoking
and  cancer,  and  neither  does  he  say  anything  about  the  rates  of  risk.  Fisher  merely
pointed to genetics as a common factor that should not be overlooked when establishing
causality  for  an  important  disease.  In  the  end,  it  indeed  will  also  be  molecules  that
interact with molecules.
Nevertheless,  the  ratio’s  of  51%  and  24%  struck  a  chord,  and  got  interpreted  as  such
prevalences.
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Cornfield  et  al.  1959 stated:  “if,  cigarette  smokers have 9 times the risk of nonsmokers
for developing lung cancer, and this is not because cigarette smoke is a causal agent, but
only  because  cigarette  smokers  produce  hormone  X,  then  the  proportion  of
hormone-X-producers among cigarette smokers must be at least 9 times greater than that
of  non-smokers. If  the  relative  prevalence  of  hormone-X-producers is  considerably  less
than ninefold, then hormone X cannot account for the magnitude of the apparent effect.”
(Taken from Schield (2003).)
They  thus  identified  a  ‘minimum  effect  size’  for  possible  confounders:  the  relative
prevalence  (p versus  q)  must  be  at  least  the  seeming relative  risk  (RF  versus  BF).  One
can  impose  this  condition  if  there  is  adequate  (theoretical)  reason  that  the  causal
relations should be proportional. This is OK as it is.
Fisher  had mentioned the numbers of 51% and 24% and this got interpreted  as a 2-fold
relative prevalence. This could not explain the 9-fold relative risk for smoking itself. 
But this was not what Fisher had expressed.  Thus, the minimum effect size got into the
literature  by  confusion.  Schield  (2003)  states:  “Fisher  never  replied.”   But  would  you
“reply”  if  you  say  “A”  and  somebody  else  says  “not  B  but  C”  ?  Fisher  already  had
replied on confusion, and one can imagine that he would have been perplexed when this
very remark targetted towards clarity was confounded itself. 
The Fisher model
Fisher’s  suggestion  comes  down  to  creating  groups  with  different  genotypes.  A
“genotype”  can  be  defined  such  that  the  risk  for  getting  cancer  and  the  inclination  to
smoke  are  biologically  proportional.  This  is  modelled  as  statistical  independence.  It  is
crucial  to  see  that  biological  proportionality  is  modelled  such  -  and  the  biological
explanation  is  that  the  genotype  here  deals  with  “other  causes”.  If  the  risk  of  getting
cancer and the inclination to smoke are not statistically independent then we split up the
group  again,  if  necessary  down  to  the  individual  level.  For  ease,  we  take  two  groups,
those with “riskier” genes and those with “safer” genes. Risk group A of size nA  has risk
SA to get cancer (a “Success”) and inclination FA to smoke. Background risk group B has
nB,  SB  and FB.  By necessity of  our  definition,  in group A the  probabilities  {SA,  1 - SA}
and  {FA,  1  -  FA} would  be statistically  independent.  The  non-smokers in  A would  still
get cancer at rate SA. Each group has a proportional relation to its two variables that does
not change with group size. The overall outcome is the sum of those tables  weighed by
the sizes of the groups. 
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TableForm@Transpose@8nA PrTable@SA, FAD, nB PrTable@SB, FBD<, 82, 1, 3<D,
TableHeadings Æ
88"Cancer", Not@"Cancer"D<, 8"A", "B"<, 8"Smoking", Not@"Smoking"D<<D
A B
Cancer
Smoking FA nA SA
Ÿ Smoking H1 -FAL nA SA
FB nB SB
H1 -FBL nB SB
Ÿ Cancer
Smoking FA nA H1 - SAL
Ÿ Smoking H1 - FAL nA H1 - SAL
FB nB H1 - SBL
H1 - FBL nB H1 - SBL
In  this  square  Y  /  N  stands  for  having  (risk  for)  cancer  and  the  +  /  -  stand  for  the
presence  of  the  confounder.  The  cause  would  be the  genotype which thus  occupies  the
columns.
ETCSquare@Label, First Æ 8"Y", "A", "+"<, Last Æ 8"N", "B", "-"<D;
YA+
YA-
YB+
YB-
NA+
NA-
NB+
NB-
For  this  dichotomous  and  stratefied  model  (with  possibly  more  strata  than  just  two),
Kleinbaum et al.  (2003:423) advise: “The Mantel-Haenszel test  is the most widely used
and  recommended procedure  for  testing  an overall  association  in  a  stratefied  analysis.”
But  they  add  (p429),  pointing  to  a  Simpson  effect:  “When  there  is  opposite  direction
interaction, use of the Mantel-Haenszel test is often inappropriate because it may mask a
strong  interaction  effect  that  reflects  the  true  exposure  disease  relationship.”  The  latter
point  is only noted here. Our reason to quote this is merely to point out that this Fisher
model is do-able and does in no way relate to criticism of the minimum effect size issue
that history attributes to it.
The  Fisher  model  is  special  in  that  it  assumes  (1)  statistical  independence,  (2)
proportionality to group sizes, and (3) a degree of presence (different rates per group, all
down the alphabet, since Fisher did not limit himself to two groups), (4) the genotype is
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a common cause  for  both confounder  and effect.  Alternatives  to  these assumptions are:
(ad  1)  statistical  dependence,  for  example due to  random causes  not  mentioned, or  that
we have not  disaggregated enough, (ad  2) non-proportionality  for  various other  reasons
than aggregation, (ad 3) presence or absence (thus dichotomy only), (ad 4) allow causal
independence between cause and confounder. 
The  analysis in the main body of the text  departs  from the Fisher model in these ways:
(ad  4)  allow  causal  independence  between  cause  and  confounder,  (ad  3)  presence  or
absence,  (ad  1)  allow  statistical  dependence,  (ad  2)  allow  indeterminacy  on
proportionality,  since  we  have  only  one  table.  We  don’t  have  “groups”  but
subpopulations  who are  exposed to  the  cause  or  not.  Of necessity  these  subpopulations
are  groups  anyhow, yet  they are  not  the  groups  that  are  by definition  intended  to  have
independent probabilities. 
If  the cause  is  absent  then one generally would presume that  the effect  does not  occur,
yet  we  still  will  allow  for  some  “background  risk”  due  to  other  causes  (“  causes  not
mentioned”).  Or alternatively,  if  there should always be a value 0 somewhere, then one
would have to reshuffle the data.
By consequence, the main body of the text uses different variable names than the one in
this appendix on Fisher’s model.
It  must  also  be  remarked  that  the  Fisher  model  does  not  say  anything  about  causality.
The direction of events derives from a different  kind of reasoning than the mere way of
tabulating the data.
Some other remarks
The 2 × 2 × 2 case that we studied in the main body of the text is sufficiently general to
be used to study the Fisher model as well, since that is minimally  2 × 2 × 2 as well. Yet
one  must  keep  those  issues  in  mind  when  making  the  translation  (“confusus
definitionis”).  An  inquisitive  reader  may  note  that  our  example  table,  that  is  entirely
fictitious,  already contains p = 51% and q = 24%, so that the 800 persons could be seen
as  fraternal  twins,  and  the  confounder  would  be  “having  distinctly  different  smoking
habits”. Also there is a relative average risk of about 9. The other numbers on effect and
cause  are  entirely  fictitious  though.  It  thus  is  dubious  what  one  can  do  with  this,  in
particular  since  “having  a  different  smoking  habit  than  your  twin  brother”  is
non-informative on smoking at all.
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Needless to say, this author thinks that smoking is a cause for cancer.  Yet, it  would not
be  right  to  misread  Fisher.  His  warning  was  against  confounding,  about  mistaking
correlation  for  causation.  His  model  was  adequate  and his  observation  of  the  influence
of  genetics  was  important.  In the  same way of  “getting  the  record  straight”,  it  must  be
remarked  that,  though  Schield  (2003)  follows  the  historically  grown interpretation  that
Fisher’s  51%  and  24%  would  be  prevalences,  which  they  are  not,  this  author  is
enormously  indebted  to  Schield  for  helping  to  understand  the  issue.  It  did  take  some
effort  to  first  understand  Schield  (2003)  and  then  to  see  that  the  issue  is  slightly
different, yet, in the end it was an important point to start from.
It still  is  not  entirely  clear  to  this  author  whether  this  issue is  one of  proportionality  or
one  of  imposing  conditional  independence.  For  epidemiologists  it  may  be  natural  to
think in  terms of  conditional  independence,  so  that  for  them the  insight  of  Cornfield  et
al.  derives  from  the  proportionality.  For  an  economist  though,  contingency  tables  in
principle  might take any values,  everything is  proportional  to n,  and the insight  is  from
imposing relative freedom. 
It  is  not  clear  to  this  author  whether  Fisher  historically  knew  about  the  notion  of
conditional  independence.  It would be strange however to assume that he would not, in
all  practical  matters,  have  used  the  notion.  Perhaps  the  notation  and  the  developed
mathematics  must  have  been  unknown  since  these  were  of  a  later  date,  yet,  those
concepts, to an important degree, merely express common sense. It would seem, at least
to  this  author,  that  Fisher  might  have  thought:  ‘You  folks  may come  with  all  kinds  of
explanations  for  lung  cancer,  yet,  please  be  aware  that  correlation  is  no  causation,  and
for  example  that  new wonderful  invention  of  genetics  might be  the  true  cause’.  Which
thought is caught by that double bar in P[Y || X].
Epidimiological language and conventions
This sub-section uses Schields notation. For translation (us = Schield):  S = E, C = C, F
= A.
Schield  (2003:3)  in the  first  column states:  “If factor  A (smoking) had no effect  on the
likelihood  of  an  observable  effect  E  (lung  cancer),  Cornfield  et  al.  proved  that  the
prevalence  of  the  actual  cause  (C)  must  satisfy:  P(C|A)  /  P(C|A') >  P(E|A)  /  P  (E|A').”
(In our notation this is p / q > RF  / BF .)
However, this statement is totally incomprehensible since it has not been defined for the
reader what “had no effect” means. It might be (1) P[E, A] or (2) P[E | A] or (3) P[E | C,
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A]  or  (4)  P[E  ||  A].  Schield  (2003:3)  then  in  the  second  column  gives  a  sufficient
condition for “no effect”, which is conditional independence, of E ¦ A | C. It is not clear
whether  sufficiency  is  actually  the  definition.  Also,  it  seems  to  amount  to  begging the
question.  Yes, if  there  is  this  relative  freedom then the Cornfield et  al.  condition  holds,
as  well  as  R  -  B  ≥  RF  -  BF ,  but  it  does  not  of  necessity  follow  that  A  (our  F)  is  a
confounder if and only if E ¦ A | C. 
Schield  (2003:3)  states:  “The  necessary  condition  of  Cornfield  et  al  is  the positive side
of  Simpson's  Paradox.  It  allowed  statisticians  to  conclude  that,  to  the  best  of  their
knowledge, smoking caused cancer – based on observational studies.” 
This  is  not  quite  true.  The  main body of  the  text  showed that  the  EXZ analysis  can be
inverted  to  some EZX form that  satisfies  all  conditions.  One requires  additional  theory
on how the world operates to truly arrive at a decision.
In his  own Appendix, Schield (2003:7) quotes the Appendix A of Cornfield  et al.  (who
use  a  different  notation  again):  “Let  the  disease  rate  for  those  exposed  to  the  causal
agent B,  be r1  and for  those not exposed,  r2,  each rate  being unaffected by exposure or
nonexposure to the noncausal agent, A.” 
However, this statement is totally incomprehensible since it has not been defined for the
reader  what  “being unaffected  by exposure or  nonexposure” means. It  is  only fortunate
that  the  present  author  heard  about  the  notion  of  “conditional  independence”  and  was
able  to  make an  educated  guess.  But  your author  remained and remains perplexed  why
one would make such an assumption,  since it  might very well  be that  r  ∫  R. These are
serious  diseases.  One  should  not  impose  assumptions  from  thin  air  and  without  even
speaking about them. But the author has had no boot camp in epidemiology, so he may
have  missed  basic  training.  Part  of  the  solution  appears  the  paradigm  that  biological
proportionality  tends  to  be  modelled  as  statistical  independence.  And  it  is  likely  the
simplest model that one tries. Perhaps that is all.
Appendix C: Deductions on safety
It will be useful to substitute:
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sol = Solve@c ä p f + q H1 - fL, pD@@1DD
:p Ø c+ f q - qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
>
This is the total when S and ¬S are added.
ETCTable@"TC", f, 8p, q<D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder f p f H1 - pL f
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q H1 - f L H1 - qL 1 - f
Sum f p + H1 - f L q - f p + f q - q + 1 1
mat = Take@%, 2, 2D;
This gives the part for ¬S. 
w = P[¬S | C, F] = P[¬S, C, F] /  P[C,  F]  = P[¬S, C, F] / (p  f)
v = P[¬S | ¬C, F] = P[¬S, ¬C, F] /  P[¬C, F]  = P[¬S, ¬C, F] / ((1 - p)  f)
e = P[¬S | C, ¬F]  = P[¬S, C, ¬F] / P[C, ¬F]  = P[¬S, C, ¬F] / (q (1 - f))
a = P[¬S | ¬C, ¬F]  = P[¬S, ¬C, ¬F] / P[¬C, ¬F] = P[¬S, ¬C, ¬F] / ((1 - q) (1 - f))
88P@ÿ S, C, FD, P@ÿ S, ÿ C, FD<, 8P@ÿ S, C, ÿ FD, P@ÿ S, ÿ C, ÿ FD<< ä
88w p f, v H1- pL f<, 8H1 - rL q H1 - fL, H1 - bL H1 - qL H1- fL<< ê. sol
i
k
jj PHŸ S, C, FL PHŸ S, Ÿ C, FL
PHŸ S, C, Ÿ FL PHŸ S, Ÿ C, Ÿ FL
y
{
zz  i
k
jjjj
Hc + f q - qLw f I1 - c+ f q-qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
M v
H1 - f L q H1 - rL H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
y
{
zzzz
This has in fact be put in a separate routine as well.
ETCTable@"TC»-S", 8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D
Cause Ÿ Cause
Confounder Hc - H1 - f L qLw f I1 - c-H1- f L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
M v
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q H1 - rL H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
Sum H1 - f L q H1 - rL+ Hc- H1 - f L qLw H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL + f I1 - c-H1- f L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
matnots = Take@%, 2, 2D
i
k
jjjj
Hc- H1 - f L qLw f I1 - c-H1- f L qÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
f
M v
H1 - f L q H1 - rL H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
y
{
zzzz
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Substraction from the total gives the part for S.
mats = mat - matnots ê. sol êê Simplify
i
k
jj-Hc+ H f - 1L qL Hw- 1L Hc + f Hq - 1L- qL Hv- 1L
-H f - 1L q r b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
y
{
zz
And this is the whole matrix again
matsol = 8mats êê Transpose, matnots êê Transpose< êê Simplify;
XminusAToAminusX@%D;
TableForm@%D
Hc- H1 - f L qL H1 -wL
H1 - f L q r
-Hc- f H1 - qL - qL H1 - vL
b H1 - f L H1 - qL
Hc- H1 - f L qLw
H1 - f L q H1 - rL
H-c+ f H1 - qL + qL v
H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
A small check:
Add@%D êê Simplify
1
Hence, the routine creates that output.
lis = SafetyToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D;
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder Hc - H1 - f L qL H1 -wL
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q r
H-c+ f H1 - qL + qL H1 - vL
b H1 - f L H1 - qL
Ÿ Success
Confounder Hc - H1 - f L qLw
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q H1 - rL
H-c+ f H1 - qL + qL v
H1 - bL H1 - f L H1 - qL
Appendix D: Deductions on risk
Recall:
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ETCTable@"TC", f, 8p, q<D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Confounder f p f H1 - pL f
Ÿ Confounder H1 - f L q H1 - f L H1 - qL 1 - f
Sum f p + H1 - f L q - f p + f q - q + 1 1
ETCTable@"ET", c, 8R, B<D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success c R B H1 - cL B H1 - cL+ c R
Ÿ Success c H1 - RL H1 - BL H1 - cL c B- B- c R+ 1
Sum c 1 - c 1
Instead of these averages we are interested in the driving risks (using above TC table):
r = P[S | C, ¬F] = P[S, C, ¬F] / (P[C | ¬F] P[¬F]) = P[S, C, ¬F] / (q (1 - f))
b = P[S | ¬C, ¬F] = P[S, ¬C, ¬F] / (P[¬C | ¬F] P[¬F]) = P[S, ¬C, ¬F] / ((1 - q) (1
- f))
And  this  allows  us  to  understand  what  happens  in  general  when  the  confounder  is  not
present:
P[S, C | ¬F] = P[S, C, ¬F] / P[¬F] =  r q
P[S, ¬C | ¬F] = P[S, ¬C, ¬F] / P[¬F] =  b (1 - q)
When  we  consider  the  group  ¬F as  a  whole,  conditionally,  then  we  find  the  following
table - which is also the second ratio table printed in the above ETCStatistics output.
† This looks only at the group with ¬F. All values must be multiplied by 1 - f.
ETCTable@"ET", q, 8r, b<D
Cause Ÿ Cause Total
Success q r b H1 - qL b H1 - qL+ q r
Ÿ Success q H1 - rL H1 - bL H1 - qL q b - b - q r+ 1
Sum q 1 - q 1
If we substract this result (multiplied by 1 - f) from the earlier total, we get the matrix for
the group with F. Hence we have parameterized the whole 2 × 2 × 2 matrix. 
lis = RiskToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8R, B<D;
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TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD êê Simplify
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder H f - 1L q r+ c R
Ÿ Confounder -H f - 1L q r
-c B+ B+ b H-q f + f
b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
Ÿ Success
Confounder -R c+ c + q H-r f + f + r- 1L
Ÿ Confounder H f - 1L q Hr- 1L
B Hc - 1L- c+ f + b H f - 1L Hq
-Hb - 1L H f - 1L Hq - 1L
lis2 = SafetyToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D;
TableForm@lis2, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD êê Simplify
Cause Ÿ Cause
Success
Confounder -Hc+ H f - 1L qL Hw- 1L
Ÿ Confounder -H f - 1L q r
Hc+ f Hq - 1L- qL Hv- 1L
b H f - 1L Hq - 1L
Ÿ Success
Confounder Hc + H f - 1L qLw
Ÿ Confounder H f - 1L q Hr- 1L
H-c+ f - f q + qL v
-Hb - 1L H f - 1L Hq - 1L
eqs = Thread@Flatten@lisD ä Flatten@lis2DD ê. True :> Sequence@D;
sol = Solve@eqs, 8R, B<D êê Simplify êê XminusAToAminusX
::RØ - H1 - f L q H-r-w + 1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
-w+ 1, B Ø
b H f - 1L Hq - 1L + H-c+ f H1 - qL + qL H1 - vL
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
1 - c
>>
Hence the routine reproduces that.
rs = ETCAverageRisksFromSafety@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D
:-w+ H1 - f L q Hr+w - 1LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
c
+ 1,
b H f - 1L Hq - 1L + H-c+ f H1 - qL + qL H1 - vL
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
1 - c
>
In case c = q: R ã r (1 - f) + f (1 -w), B ã b (1 - f) + f (1 - v):
8R ä r H1 - fL + f H1 -wL, B ä b H1 - fL + f H1 - vL< ê. sol@@1DD ê. c Æ q êê Simplify
8True, True<
PM.  The  risk  parameterization  using  safety  simplifies  to  the  one  using  risk,  when  we
substitute the risks created from safety.
lis = SafetyToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8w, v<D;
lis2 = RiskToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, rsD;
lis ä lis2 êê Simplify
True
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Appendix E: The risk difference
Schield (2003) provides evidence that the risk difference would be instructive to identify
a Simpson paradox, not only algebraically but also psychologically.
Schield (2003:5): “Consider two hospitals: a city hospital and a rural hospital. The death
rate is 3% of cases at the city hospital versus 2% at the rural. The combined death rate is
2.7%.  Thus,  it  seems  that  the  rural  hospital  is  safer  than  the  city  hospital.  (...)  Now
consider  a  plausible  confounding  factor:  the  condition  of  the  patient’s  health.  We  find
that  overall  the  death  rate  among patients  in  poor  condition  is  3.8%  while  that  among
patients  in good condition  is  1.2%.  Here the simple difference  in death rates  by patient
condition  (2.6  percentage points)  is  greater  than the simple difference  in  death rates  by
hospital  (1  percentage  point).  Thus  we  have  strong  reason  to  be  concerned  about  a
possible  Simpson’s Paradox reversal of the association between hospital  and death rate.
To guard against such a reversal we can take into account (control for) patient condition
when comparing the death rates for these two hospitals.”
As we have seen,  the  mathematics  of  the  ETC problem is  fairly  simple,  but  translation
remains  a  stumble  block.  In  above  story,  the  true  cause  is  the  health  condition  while
Schield  labels  it  the  “confounder”.  So  we  would  first  translate  the  text  to  the  EZX
situation  and  then  invert  to  EXZ  again.  Let  us  try  to  do  this  in  one  step.  The  second
element  in  the  translation  is  that  the  discussion  is  indiscriminate  about  “death  rates”
while  some  are  marginals  (averages)  while  other  might  be  parameters.  There  are  no
clearly stated marginals s, c and f so we have to infer those from the averages. The third
snitch is that epidemiologists assume {R, B} = {r, b}, for otherwise they could not keep
the number of variables down. The fourth problem is that Schield refers to the Simpson
paradox and uses Cornfield’s condition R - B ≥ RF  - BF  to solve it, which is needlessly
strong.  A  fifth  point  is  that  the  Simpson  paradox  would  not  occur  in  a  truly  causal
model.  Admittedly,  though,  the  distinction  between  city  and  rural  hospitals  is  hardly  a
causal  one,  so  that  this  is  indeed  a  model  of  aggregating  subpopulations,  which  is  the
habitat of the Simpson paradox. A sixth issue is that “to control” is not really defined so
that  it  is  not  really clear  what the  solution is.  If we had the  solution then it  would also
become clear what the original problem was (what we lacked in knowledge).
Translating we find S = death, C = bad health, F = city hospital, s = 2.7%, RF  = 3%, BF
= 2%, r = R = 3.8%, b = B =  1.2%. From the section above on the relative freedom of
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the variables we know that RF  = p r + (1 - p) b and BF  = q r + (1 - q) b. There is only
one way that these numerical values can fit our equations.
vals = 8s Æ 0.027, r Æ 0.038, b Æ 0.012, Rf Æ .03, Bf Æ .02<;
eqs = 8 s ä c R + H1 - cLB,
s ä f Rf + H1 - fLBf,
c ä p f + q H1 - fL ,
Rf ä p r + H1 - pL b < ê. 8R Æ r, B Æ b< ê. vals
80.027  0.012 H1 - cL + 0.038 c, 0.027  0.02 H1 - f L+ 0.03 f ,
c  f p + H1 - f L q, 0.03  0.012 H1 - pL+ 0.038 p<
sol = Solve@eqs, 8c, f, p, q<D
88cØ 0.576923, p Ø 0.692308, q Ø 0.307692, f Ø 0.7<<
lis = RiskToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8r, b<D ê. vals ê. sol@@1DD ;
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD ê.
8"Cause" Æ "Bad health",
"Confounder" Æ "City hospital", "Success" Æ "Death"<
Bad health Ÿ Bad health
Death
City hospital 0.0184154
Ÿ City hospital 0.00350769
0.00258462
0.00249231
Ÿ Death
City hospital 0.4662
Ÿ City hospital 0.0888
0.2128
0.2052
The  reason  why  we  took  Schield’s  example  is  to  follow  his  suggestion  on  the  risk
difference.  The Schield plot shows the differences between the four parameters with the
total  average at the center of gravity. Since the risk difference of the cause (bad health)
is  larger  than  the  risk  difference  of  the  seeming  cause  (city  hospital),  the  Cornfield
condition is satisfied. Indeed, if you had a reverse state of mind, and thought that the true
cause  was  the  difference  in  quality  in  city  and  rural  hospitals,  then  you would  have to
worry about  confounding and the Simpson paradox.  Our analysis  shows that  we should
not  stick  to  just  these  risk  rates  but  consider  the  whole  ETC  2  ×  2  ×  2  table.  The
assumption  that  {R,  B}  =  {r,  b}  is  too  quick  and  likely  hides  the  true  relations.  (Thus
there  is  no  reason  to  further  investigate  the  issue  of  the  relative  performance  of  the
hospitals.)
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†  {R, B} = {r, b}
SchieldShow@0.027, 0.038, 0.012, .03, .02, "R - B vs Rf - Bf"D;
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
R − B vs Rf − Bf
Appendix F: A counterfactual in Pearl (2000)
Pearl (2000:35-36) gives a wonderful example on counterfactuals. The problem situation
differs  from  our  ETC  world  since  this  example  may  have  two  causes.  But  a  short
discussion will clarify both the ETC assumptions and a bit about the counterfactual. Let
us  first  re-create  the  problem  and  then  summarize  our  finding.  There  are  two  random
variables  u1  and  u2  that  can  take  values  {1,  0}  with  a  flip  of  a  coin  (P  =  1/2).  The
variables are S = death, C = u2, F = Yes = u1.There are two models:
Model 1:  S = C
Model 2:  S = C  F + (1 - C ) (1 - F)
The  reader  will  note  that  Pearl  (2000)  calls  F  =  u1  the  “treatment”  variable,  which
suggests that it would be the cause. But from the structure of Model 1 we can see that u2
is  the  cause.  Perhaps  one  might  better  call  u2  the  “treatment”.  Thus  it  seems  that  this
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example on counterfactuals  is  a  bit  confounded with treating a EZX model instead of a
EXZ model.  To  allow  the  comparison  with  Pearl  (2000)  we stick  to  his  label  F =  u1=
“treatment”. 
lab = 8"Success" Æ "Death", "Cause" Æ "u2" , "Confounder" Æ "Treatment"<;
† This is Model 1. It is a perfectl simple causal model.
func@x_, y_, z_D := If@x == y, .25, 0D
lis = Outer@func, 81, 0<, 81, 0<, 81, 0<D;
TableForm@lis, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD ê. lab
u2 Ÿ u2
Death
Treatment 0.25
Ÿ Treatment 0.25
0
0
Ÿ Death
Treatment 0
Ÿ Treatment 0
0.25
0.25
ETCSquare@lisD;
0.25
0.25
0
0
0
0
0.25
0.25
SCF
SCf
ScF
Scf
sCF
sCf
scF
scf
† This is Model 2.
func2@x_, y_, z_D := If@x == yz + H1 - yL H1- zL, .25, 0D
lis2 = Outer@func2, 81, 0<, 81, 0<, 81, 0<D;
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TableForm@lis2, TableHeadings Æ CT@"ETC", TableHeadingsDD ê. lab
u2 Ÿ u2
Death
Treatment 0.25
Ÿ Treatment 0
0
0.25
Ÿ Death
Treatment 0
Ÿ Treatment 0.25
0.25
0
ETCSquare@lis2D;
0.25
0
0
0.25
0
0.25
0.25
0
SCF
SCf
ScF
Scf
sCF
sCf
scF
scf
One may check that both matrices have the same marginal distribution {{.25, .25}, {.25,
.25}} when C =  u2  or F = u1  is summed out. Thus the relative risks for both cause and
confounder are 1.
Pearl  (2000:36): “Model 1 corresponds to treatment (X) that has no effect on any of the
subjects;  in  model  2,  every  subject  is  affected  by  treatment.  The  reason  that  the  two
models  generate  the  same  distribution  is  that  model  2  describes  a  mixture  of  two
subpopulations.  In one  (u2  =  1),  each  subject  dies  (y  = 1)  if  and  only  if  treated;  in  the
other (u2 = 0), each subject recovers (y = 0) if and only if treated.”
Pearl is interested at this point in the counterfactual. For lack of a better notation we can
write Q = P[( y = 0 | x = 0) | (y = 1, x = 1)] for the counterfactual that a person who died
under  treatment  (the  outer  condition)  would  have  recovered  under  non-treatment  (the
inner condition). 
Pearl (2000:36): “The value of Q differs from these two models. In model 1, Q evaluates
to zero, because subjects  who died correspond to u2  = 1 and, since the treatment has no
effect  on  y,  changing  X  from  1  to  0  would  still  yield  y  =  1.  In  model  2,  however,  Q
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evaluates to unity, because subjects who died under treatment must correspond to u2  = 1
(i.e. those who die if treated), meaning they would recover if and only if not treated.”
We  can  capture  the  counterfactual  also  in  the  basic  statistics.  This  corresponds  with
Pearl’s  remark:  “knowledge  about  the  actual  process  behind  P(y  |  x)  is  needed  for  the
computation”.  Once  we  have  the  full  crosstable  with  all  8  entries  then  we  have  full
information about the table, and then also the counterfactuals can be calculated. But it is
not entirely clear why we should link this issue to counterfactuals.  Having the full table
allows us to calculate all kinds of things, including counterfactuals. But we want the full
table  for  various  purposes,  not  only  counterfactuals.  To  put  disproportionate  emphasis
on counterfactuals might be a “confusus counterfactualis”. 
When we run the statistics  then we get (using Hold[SafetyToETCArray]  to identify the
parameters):
SafetyToETCArray@D ê. ETCStatistics@lis, Print Æ FalseD
Hold@SafetyToETCArrayD@80.5, 1., 0<, 80.5, 0.5<, 80, 1.<, 1.D
SafetyToETCArray@D ê. ETCStatistics@lis2, Print Æ FalseD
Hold@SafetyToETCArrayD@80.5, 0, 1.<, 80.5, 0.5<, 80, 1.<, 1.D
Thus:
   †  Model 1 is a perfect model for a simple cause, with r = 1, b = 0,  w = 0 and v = 
1.
   †  Model 2 describes a perverse simple cause, albeit with w = 0 and v = 1, but r = 
0, b = 1. The background risk determines all and the “cause” is totally 
ineffective. Though u2 was correctly identified as the cause for Model 1 we 
mistakenly believed, purely on its name, that we have a related kind of causal 
structure in Model 2. Indeed, we have the same u2 and we also see deaths, so, 
there must be something constant. But the only thing that is constant is “there is 
a probability distribution”. What we did not notice is that between Model 1 and 
Model 2 there was a huge shift in the actual probabilities, notably on the risks 
for the cause and the background. It is like a movie that is hugely popular 
amongst teenagers and then assuming that will be similarly popular amongst the 
elderly too, just because it still is the same movie. 
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† We may try to do the EZX transformation to see whether Treatment now is the 
true cause. But transponation gives us the same data format.
CT@Set, Label Æ "Pearl2",
Dimensions Æ CT@DimensionsD, Data Æ lis2, Source Æ "Created"D;
CT@Order, 8"Effect", "Confounding"<, "Pearl2"D ê. lab
Treatment Ÿ Treatment
Death
u2 0.25
Ÿ u2 0
0
0.25
Ÿ Death
u2 0
Ÿ u2 0.25
0.25
0
† Indeed, also if we try Treatment as the cause then we still have the perverse r 
= 0 and b = 1.
SafetyToETCArray@D ê. ETCStatistics@%, Print Æ FalseD
Hold@SafetyToETCArrayD@80.5, 0, 1.<, 80.5, 0.5<, 80, 1.<, 1.D
† A solution is to call absence of the cause to be the true cause, with r = 1 and b  
= 0 though at a price of w  = 1 and v = 0.
CT@Switch, "Pearl-Invert", "Pearl2", "Truth" Æ 8Not@"Cause"D, "Cause"<D
Ÿ Cause Cause
Success
Confounder 0
Ÿ Confounder 0.25
0.25
0
Ÿ Success
Confounder 0.25
Ÿ Confounder 0
0
0.25
SafetyToETCArray@D ê. ETCStatistics@%, Print Æ FalseD
Hold@SafetyToETCArrayD@80.5, 1., 0<, 80.5, 0.5<, 81., 0<, 1.D
A strong conclusion  would be that  Pearl’s  Model  2 may very well  be a  possible  model
with nice probabilities in a 2 × 2 × 2 table, but it does not fit the ETC mold. For ETC we
have  been  considering  a  cause  and  a  confounder,  but  in  Model  2  we  meet  with  two
causes,  and we have not modelled such a case including their interaction.  We may have
suffered a bit from the “confusus definitionis”,  mistaking a 2 × 2 × 2 table for the ETC
problem, just because it was a 2 × 2 × 2 table. 
It  may  well  be  that  Pearl’s  comment  on  the  subpopulations  is  relevant.  That  would
introduce a fourth variable. It all  depends upon the problem. The fourth variable should
explain why the same cause from Model 1 should suddenly get perverse effects. 
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But another solution is to stick to the three-variable world and pay closer attention to the
actual  definition  of the probability distribution  for  Model 2.  There  we find that  there is
only a  success  if  we have,  in logical  terms,  the true cause   = (C fl F)  fi  (¬ C fl  ¬ F).
Thus instead of going into the fourth dimension we actually have a smaller model from
the 2 × 2 world with a perfect simple causal structure:
ET  Ÿ 
Death 0.5 0
Life 0 0.5
This  only  goes  to  show  that  the  human  mind  might  work  best  when  it  can  reduce
complex  reality  to  the  simple  causal  model  or  logical  relations.  If  we  would  meet
phenomena with that particular reaction as in Model 2 then we would quickly find a new
word for the particular combination and include it under the list of dangerous events. 
Appendix G: Routines
This discussion uses The Economics Pack, Cool (2001). 
?ETCArrayQ
ETCArrayQ@xD returns True if x is a 82, 2, 2< array, and otherwise False
?SafetyToETCArray
SafetyToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8x, y<, n:1D is an
application of ToETCArray so that 8x, y< is interpreted as 8w, v<
SafetyToETCArray@D contains in Hold how the output of
ETCStatistics could be used to create the same input array
SafetyToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8x, y<, n:1D is an
application of ToETCArray so that 8x, y< is interpreted as 8w, v<
?RiskToETCArray
RiskToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f , q<, 8x, y<, n:1D is an
application of ToETCArray so that 8x, y< is interpreted as 8R, B<
RiskToETCArray@D contains in hold how the output of
ETCStatistics could be used to create the same input matrix
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?ToETCArray
ToETCArray@8c, r, b<, 8f , q<, 8x, y<, n:1D gives a 2 x 2 x 2 table with the
order Effect, Truth, Confounding. Option ETCParms determines how x
and y are interpreted. Method -> Safety is default, the alternative is Risk:
ToETCArray@Safety, 8c, r, b<, 8f , q<, 8w, v<, n:1D
ToETCArray@Risk, 8c, r, b<, 8f, q<, 8R, B<, n:1D
The meaning of the parameters is
c = Pr@CD = marginal of the cause = p f + q H1 - fL;
f = Pr@FD = marginal of the confounder
p = Pr@C » FD = chance that the cause occurs given F Hsolved from cL
q = Pr@C » !FD = chance that the cause occurs given F
r = Pr@S » C, !FD = risk
b = Pr@S » !C, !FD = background risk
R = Pr@S » CD = average risk
B = Pr@S » !CD = average background risk
w = Pr@Not@SD » C, FD = miraculous = wunderbar
v = Pr@Not@SD » Not@CD, FD = background safety
e = 1 - r = exceptional safety Hthe cause's failure rateL
a = 1 - b = background safety Hall absentL
n = total number of cases
Option "Round" controls rounding, default it does.
Substitute p = q = c iff c and f are marginally independent.
ToETCArray@Confounder, 8c, r, b<,
8p, q<, 8R, B<, n:1D uses f = Hc - qLêHp - qL for p > q.
Enter r > b otherwise reverse the definition of what is the cause, absence rather than presence.
But R > B is not tested though this essentially would also better relabelled if it is not so.
One would use p > q as well.
?ETCAverageRisksFromSafety
ETCAverageRisksFromSafety@8c, r, b<, 8f , q<, 8w, v<D gives 8R, B<.
w = P@Not@SD » C, FD, w from wunderbar = miraculous
v = P@Not@SD » Not@CD, FD safety Hfrom Dutch "veiligheid"L
See ETCStatistics and ToETCArray for the other parameters
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?ETCStatistics
ETCStatistics@matD for a 2 x 2 x 2 matrix with the ETC layout of Effect, Truth,
Confounding, generates summary statistics. See ETCPrTable and ETCTable.
ETCStatistics@optsD uses default CT@"ETC", DataD
Subtables and probabilities in output are
ETCStatistics@"Cause"D for the average cause for Success, with
R = Pr@Success » CauseD
B = Pr@Success » Not@CauseDD.
ETCStatistics@"Confounder"D for the confounding probabilities
p = Pr@Cause » ConfounderD
q = Pr@Cause » Not@ConfounderDD.
ETCStatistics@"Seeming"D for the erroneous
view where the success is related to the confounder, with
Rf = Pr@Success » ConfounderD
Bf = Pr@Success » Not@ConfounderDD
Option Print -> Hdefault TrueL controls printing of subtables, Simplify -> Hdefault TrueL
simplifies tables in printing, N -> Hdefault TrueL applies to the rate table in printing
?ETCRiskTable
ETCRiskTable@resD uses res = ETCStatistics@...D to make
a table of the various risks and their values, difference and ratio's
ETCRiskTable@resD uses res = Results@ETCStatisticsD that are
default present after the statistics routine has been called
?ETCPrTable
ETCPrTable@D lists the table of key risks
and probabilities of the Effect, Truth, Confounding table
?ETCTable
ETCTable@22, labD takes CT@lab, DataD that
must be 2 by 2, adds border sums, and prints with TableForm
The following are border matrices:
ETCTable@"ET", c, 8R, B<D for marginal
probability of the cause c, risk R and background risk B
ETCTable@"EC", f, 8Rf, Bf<D for the marginal probability of the
confounder f , seeming risk Rf and seeming background risk Bf
ETCTable@"TC", f , 8p, q<D for the marginal probability of the confounder
f, p = Pr@cause » confounderD and q = Pr@Cause » !confounderD
ETCTable@"-S»TC", 8c, r, b<, 8f , q<, 8w, v<D shows the table for truth and confounding,
given that there is no success, with w and v the strong and weak safety
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?ETCSquare
ETCSquare@D shows ETCSquare@CT@DataDD
ETCSquare@stringD shows ETCSquare@CT@string, DataDD
ETCSquare@lisD shows the 2 x 2 x 2 square. For the ETC model, the effect
is in the rows, the truth in the columns and the confounder in the triangle
ETCSquare@LabelD just shows the labels
Options are:
Show -> Hdefault TrueL show the labels
N -> 8positions< for the positions of x and the labels
Position -> 8a, b< for the position when there are no labels. A position is just a
pair of numbers between 0 and 1, because the other positions are symmetric
TableHeadings -> Hdefault AutomaticL the list of labels, and if Automatic, it uses:
First -> 83 strings< for labels of an event
Last -> 83 strings...< for labels of the absence of the event
?ETCSimpson
ETCSimpson@8c, r, b<, 8f , q<, 8w, v<D gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
Simpson paradox to arise, by regarding the F and !F groups for which the risk difference >
0 while the total has risk difference  0. NB. The output terms are in quotes. NB.
The sufficient conditions are all True if the paradox occurs Honly for the stated caseL
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